








This masters thesis deals with the security-related aspects of the OSPF routing
protocol for use in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET).
OSPF, Open Shortest Path First, is an Intra-gateway routing protocol first
developed as an IETF effort. It is widely adopted in large enterprise-scale
networks, being well regarded for its fast convergence and loop-free routing. It
is versatile in terms of which interface types it supports, such as point-to-point
links or broadcast networks. It also offers scalability through hierarchical routing
and by using centralization to reduce the amount of overhead on networks which
have broadcast or broadcast-similar properties. An interface type missing from
the standard so far is that of a wireless network, characterized by non-guaranteed
bidirectional links combined with unreliable broadcasting, and existing interface
types generally perform poorly under these networks. The IETF has therefore
instituted a Working Group to standardize such an interface type extension to
the latest version, OSPF version 3. This interface type will permit mobility and
multi-hop characteristics in addition to those of wireless links in general. Such
networks are usually referred to as Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET). MANET
routing protocols are subject to more severe security issues than ordinary, wireline-
oriented protocols are. This thesis aims to assess and evaluate security of OSPF as
a MANET routing protocol.
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1 Introduction and background
Network routing is the process of receiving, analyzing and forwarding network
layer datagrams, or packets, in a network. This is done by routers, network nodes
that possess some information which allow them to make a decision on where
to forward the packet next. In a small network of a stable structure, this can be
done manually by the administrator, as the entire ARPANETwas in its conception.
The complexity of this task quickly passes outside of the boundaries of what is
practically accomplishable as the number of nodes increases. This problem can be
solved by letting the establishment of the pathways be an automated continuous
process,carried out by the routers themselves.
The technical specification of such a process is a routing protocol. A routing
protocol describes in detail both the underlying algorithm for determining optimal
routes according to some metric, commonly called cost, as well as the exact bit-
wise structure of the packets the routers will use. These packets serve the purposes
of exchanging information useable for making packet forwarding decisions later,
routing state. They also serve other purposes in the routing protocol, mainly
various signalling between the routers. A set of routers that communicate to each
other across one protocol reside in a common routing domain. Routing domains
overlap and complement each other in accordance with boundaries determined by
policies, topology and organization.
Efficient, stable and reliable routing is consequently of critical importance to
modern computer network functionality. The routing process provides essentially
the entire network layer connectivity of the network. An attacker intent on
disabling or degrading the performance of a computer network would therefore be
well served to explore the various possible means to attack the routing process.
Such attacks can leverage inherent weaknesses of the protocol itself, or take
advantage of illicit subversion of a router.
Routing security is the focus subject of this thesis. It is in short the study of the
counterdefenses we would employ to make such attacks as difficult as possible.
Provable security is not likely, because it usually demands costly and difficult
formal modelling, while strong or sufficient security is a more attainable goal.
Routing security research must employ the functional study of the routing protocol
itself in order to uncover basic security threats in the way the protocol is designed.
It must also identify which security services are needed to counteract such threats,
and how to implement them. The network and link layers can potentially provide
such services, and if so, the appropriate protocols must be chosen and adapted.
This implies the more generic discipline of network security. Finally, the security
of the router itself as a host must be adressed, often running a multi-user operating
system.
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1.1 Aim of this thesis
The aim of this thesis is to assess potential security threats to the OSPF routing
protocol when used for wireless networks.
OSPF, in short, is an intra-gateway routing protocol (IGP) which is commonly
used in medium-to-large networks. It supports a variety of network types
by necessity, but so far lacks a standardized wireless interface type. Efforts
are therefore being directed to adding such an interface type. This wireless
interface will not only support wireless links, but also be adapted for use
in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET), which are [wireless] networks which
offer continuous terminal mobility and multi-hop packet-forwarding, without a
centralized infrastructure.
OSPF has a number of documented security vulnerabilities, of varying severity,
and routing security researchers have also documented some of these through test-
bed experiments. In combination with the security difficulties of operating in a
MANET environment, there is a need to assess whether OSPF can operate securely
in such an environment. Security protocols can offer end-to-end security between
OSPF routers, but the protocols available may not be well suited to the needs of
a routing protocol or the demands of a MANET. Therefore, the security protocols
proposed should also be evaluated.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are highlighting security vulnerabilities in OSPF
that are aggravated by introducing the protocol into a MANET. Furthermore, the
scale of the damage of such attacks as demonstrated in wireline network testbed
experiments combined with inherent properties of MANETs are used to illustrate
the potential results of leaving these vulnerabilities unaddressed in the MANET
interface type.
The IPSec security protocol is discussed as the standardized security service
provider for the latest version of OSPF, version 3. The problems arising from
using a one-to-one protocol to secure routing protocol traffic are addressed and
explained, as well as the solutions the IETF has brought up to solve them. Last, the
IPSec protocol is analyzed from the perspective of overhead and administration.
Both perspectives see some substantial problems associated with IPSec. These
are for the large part probably solveable, but the thesis cannot accomodate these
solutions within its scope.
1.3 Methods
This thesis does not include simulated or testbed routing protocol attacks, for
reasons of capacity and scope. By focusing on a small selection of attacks with
their simulated or measured impact, the thesis would fall short of its goal of
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providing a general-purpose assessment of the security aspects that arise from
using OSPF in a MANET setting. The main issue is therefore not to show the
possible extent of damage “Attack Y” can cause.
1.4 Structure
Sections 1.4 and 2.8 of the thesis describes and documents the OSPFv3 protocol as
well as the suggested proposals for extending it with a MANET-adapted interface
type. It is quite exhaustive, with emphasis being put on making the reader new to
OSPF capable of understanding its functioning to a reasonable degree. OSPF is a
quite extensive protocol, and while a good textbook is to be found for version 2
in [30], version 3 is mainly documented in terms of their mutual differences.
Section 3.9 describes the common security services, and attempts to create
clear definitions of the concept of security in general in order to more precisely
define routing security, network security and host security to provide more clarity.
The section proceeds to describe the most central security services, all of which
could be used by a routing protocol in order to attain security. The latter part of
this section is devoted to IPSec, a security protocol suite intended to be used by
OSPFv3 to offer end-to-end security services between routers. IPSec, like OSPF,
is rather extensive. The section still has been made as short as the author believes
is necessary.
Section 4.6.3 proceeds from Section 3.9 by further elaborating on the
concept of routing security, with a focus on OSPF. It describes two main threat
models - where the attacker/adversary works from, by what means, and with what
capabilities. The motivation for this subsection is that having a clearly defined
threat model set is a prerequisite to determine potential routing protocol attacks.
It proceeds to look at work done by the IETF within routing security in general.
However, throughout the section, security aspects of OSPF are the main issues
handled.
The last section before analysis and concluding remarks is 5.9.2, in which
attack types are described in detail. Attacks directly exploiting the way OSPF
works are given priority, but more general attack types are also discussed.
The analysis of this thesis aims to combine the extensive background section
on routing security, the OSPFv3 routing protocol, attacks against OSPF and routing
protocols, and MANET routing protocols. The purpose is to conjecture firstly if
the attacks against OSPF that are already known will be affected in effectivity by
a transition to the new interface type. Secondly, IPSec will be evaluated for use as
a security service provider for a MANET routing protocol. Security challenges to
OSPF in the MANET setting are identified and discussed.
The concluding remarks sums up the findings of the analysis and background
sections, remarking on the key issues and, where possible, providing suggestions
for areas of further study.
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2 OSPF Version 3
2.1 Introduction to OSPF
Standardization of OSPFv2 began in 1987 under the auspices of the IETF, in a
designated Working Group which exists to this day. This development cycle was
one of the first major efforts of the IETF, which until then had mainly supplied
engineering and research advisory papers, and the first formal specification in the
shape of a Request For Comments (RFC) document was released in 1991. The first
version, OSPFv1, was intended for development purposes only, with the first (and
current common) operational version being OSPFv2.
As OSPF was implemented by vendors and deployed, the experiences gathered
led to improvements in the protocol specification. Towards the end of the decade,
it was apparent that IPv4 would not be a sustainable network layer protocol in the
long term, and to accomodate the new IP version as well as greater changes to the
protocol deemed beneficial which was outside of the scope of RFC revisions, the
OSPF working group began working on a new version.
Finally, a standard for OSPFv3 was first presented in December of 1999 in
RFC2740 [10] by the IETF Network Working Group. It is, for the most part,
similar to OSPFv2, documented in RFC2328 [31], in modes of operation, except
where applicable due to IPv6 being assumed to be the networking protocol which
it operates on. Therefore, RFC2740 mainly consists of establishing differences
from OSPFv2, though in all cases, care must be taken when researching the finer
points of OSPFv3, as there still are numerous differences between the two, and
most literature available covers version 2. This can make understanding OSPFv3
tedious, as merely reading the RFC, intended for developer reference more than
concise understanding, is inconvenient at best.
In order to determine and assess the security-oriented issues of OSPF in a role
as a MANET routing protocol, we will need to have a solid basic knowledge
of how the protocol operates, before moving on to the suggested improvements
encompassed by the term OSPF-MANET. The following section provides the most
necessary OSPFv3 [10] background to analyze OSPF-MANET strong and weak
points from a security perspective.
OSPF-MANET does not constitute a complete rewrite of the protocol, and less
so than OSPFv3 - OSPF was designed from the start to be versatile to ensure wide
adoption in networks that increasingly were composed of different networking
technologies other than the leased point-to-point links of the ARPANET. Network
types are represented in OSPF by the type of each interface, of which four are
defined in OSPFv3. Adding support for the peculiarities of MANET networks
(multi-hop, non-reliable broadcast) is therefore a question of defining an interface
type that precisely matches these networks and add mechanisms to this interface
type which will offer the core link-state protocol the services (reliable flooding) it
requires.
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The main motivation for creating OSPF version 3 was to accomodate IPv6.
However, this does not merely encompass fitting the longer adresses into the
protocol headers. IPv6 differs from IPv4 in crucial points, notably the replacement
of the IPv4 subnet with the IPv6 link, and the removal of the authentication header.
Also importantly, OSPFv3 addresses the need to partition a link according to
separate OSPF processes, or instances. Other changes are more subtle, but as
security often hides in the details, no less noteworthy, at least at a glance.
OSPFv3 does not identify routers using IPv6 addresses, instead substituting
them entirely for OSPFv2 32-bit Router IDs. The introduction of Link Local
Adresses in IPv6 meant that the concept of flooding scope of packets, where to
forward which types of packets, was put into effect. Where OSPFv2 only supported
one running OSPF process per network, OSPFv3 adds the concept of the instance,
which allows several running OSPF processes to share a link (IPv4 subnet). Finally,
OSPFv3 is extensible in its header processing, like IPv6, by allowing for deeper
processeing of unknown packet types. All of these features will be discussed in-
depth and analyzed for security.
OSPF is a large and complex protocol. While in-depth knowledge of it is a
necessity to assess it from a routing security perspective, there is the risk of loosing
sight amongst the finer details of it. Where possible, these should be deferred until
they become important to the subject matter at hand, i.e. whenever they are crucial
to some routing security aspect of the protocol, to avoid losing perspective amongst
the details.
2.2 Overview
OSPF is an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) intended for establishing routing
tables, or link state, between cooperating routers operating inside the administrat-
ive confines of an Autonomous System (AS), alternatively called a routing domain.
The proactive establishment of routes contrasts it with reactive routing protocols.
In the latter, a route between two hosts is established on a per-request basis, usually
with the possibility of some limited caching.
OSPF, as a true second-generation routing protocol, supports several network
types apart from the conventional serial-line, point-to-point network of the
Arpanet. However, other network types are also allowed, with the major divide
being whether the network type supports broadcast or not. An OSPF router is
configured with one or more interfaces, and, in the case of OSPFv3, instances.
These network interfaces map to specific network types; host-to-host or point-
to-point, broadcast, non-broadcast but with multiple medium access and point-to-
multipoint.
The heart of OSPF is a shortest-path first (SPF) graph traversal algorithm
known as Dijkstra’s algorithm. This algorithm can create pathways in weighted
graphs with the minimum weight efficiently. These pathways - essentially telling
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the router where to send a packet next if it is destined for any given host - are stored
as a routing table. It is easy to see how a network can be abstracted as such a graph,
with the weight on each vertex representing some concept of cost, usually time or
amount of hops. The actual implementation of Dijkstra’s algorithm is rather easy,
and can easily be done by a CS junior student with a basic course in algorithms
and data structures. The algorithm cares in no way about the type of network from
which the information is gathered, that is, what interface (link) type it is gathered
from, not about the quality of the data fed into it, so it has no security perspective.
The question of OSPF security is, in short, mainly concentrated in the part of
the protocol which disseminates and receives information it feeds into this central
algorithm - information gathered from and shared with the other protocol instances
with which it communicates. This topic will be more thorougly adressed in Section
4.6.3, with some background material on routing security in general being available
in Section 3.9
The network information gathered by the protocol interfaces and processed by
the graph traversal algorithm is finally stored in the basic data structure of OSPF,
the link state database, a complete network topology table which permits routers
to know the ID of all routers inside the domain, which routers have a direct link to
which, how many interfaces each router operates, and cost. Cost is currently not
in active use by industry vendors, preferring other means to calculate the cost of a
link for management and tallying purposes. The link-state database is maintained
and exchanged to new routers by link state advertisements emitted periodically.
Each LSA is transmitted using a technique called reliable flooding, which
implies that all routers in the routing domain/AS is guaranteed to receive the LSA.
The manner in which reliable flooding is achieved is dependent on interface type,
the type identifier that determines which link type a router interface (“network
card”) is connected to and upon which OSPF makes assumptions about broadcast
capability and media access.
OSPF transmits packets directly over IP, as opposed to using TCP, UDP or
other transport protocols. The OSPF payload is contained directly within the IP
datagram. The lack of a dedicated transport protocol to ensure reliable end-to-
end transmission required OSPF to ensure reliable flooding of OSPF information
by other means.Importantly, IPv6 offers OSPF the option of taking advantage of
the security services offered by IPSec; more on the latter follows in later sections.
Why does OSPF not use UDP or TCP, or even the link layer, to encapsulate its
packages? To address the latter first, link layer protocols like Ethernet do not
offer fragmentization of packages, consequently OSPF would need to implement
fragmentization mechanisms by itself, complicating and slowing packet ingress
and egress. In addition, to correctly perform fragmentization with varying link
layer protocols, OSPF would have had to establish a set of link layer identifier
classes that determined which link layer frame length would be used. As for TCP
and UDP, the advantage TCP offers ahead of UDP is the ability to reliably deliver
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packets on an end-to-end connection. However, OSPF itself uses mechanisms,
depending on network (interface or link) type, to ensure that packets are flooded
reliably. Likewise, to ensure TCP flooding, each router would need to establish a
TCP three-way handshake with all corresponding routers on the flooding network.
This would introduce unnecessary overhead for functionality that already exists.
UDP being the remaining candidate transport protocol, was found to offer few
advantages that OSPF truly needed. Additionally, on most systems, a UDP socket
is available to most or all users. Sending directly over IP, however, is usually
a privilege of root- or system accounts, denying average users the possibility of
sending OSPF packets, which was seen as a security benefit.
OSPF allows for hierarchical routing, dividing the network into two strata,
the higher of which is a “common” or “backbone” across which information
is disseminated between the lower. If used by the network administrators, this
hierarchy permits a network running OSPF to grow without the complexity of the
routing information exchange growing exponentially along with it. Thus it permits
scaling.
On multiaccess networks, which unlike the point-to-point links link state rout-
ing was originally conceived, the routers will either themselves elect (broadcast) or
be configured as (non-broadcast) a Designated Router, DR. The DR adds scalab-
ility further by centralizing the processing of link state databases, instead of each
router carrying out the CPU- and network-costly process itself.
2.3 IPv6 issues relevant to OSPFv3
This subsection details those parts of the IPv6 protocol which affect OSPFv3. This
includes issues both pertaining to operation, as well as security. However, the
former is the focus of this part of the thesis, hence any references to IPv6-related
security issues will be postponed until needed.
IPv6 is a development of the IPv4 network protocol component of the TCP/IP
network stack. IPv6 is intended to replace IPv4, coexisting alongside it for a period
of time using tunneling, while vendors and users are re-configuring their networks
and sunsetting legacy systems. IPv6 is mainly known for solving the address space
problems of IPv4, alleviated with NAT and classless addresses, but it also offers
other improvements - most important of which for the relevance of this thesis is
that IPSec, an end-to-end set of security protocols, is mandatory in IPv6, whereas
it is electable under IPv4. IPSec is described in detail in a separate section.
Until 1993, IPv4 used a system known as classful addresses, which separated
IP-addresses into five classes spanning from A to C (with D and E being multicast
and broadcast addresses) depending on how many “free” bits were in an address
assigned to a network. For example, class A networks, the largest, were addresses
in which the leading eight bits were network identificators leaving the remaining
24 bits free for individual hosts, with a total of 232 − 2 = 16′772′214 addresses
available in the network. Since this implied a large amount of wasted addresses,
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and a maximum amount of networks of 256 in all (including classes A, B and C),
the IETF left the concept of classful addresses behind. The system which replaces
classful addressing is the one which also introduced the concept of subnetting to
IPv4: CIDR, Classless Inter-Domain Routing. CIDR divides addresses according
to a more flexible scheme than classes do. Instead of operating with class
hierarchies in which bits are free in divisors of eight, classless addresses can set any
number of bits free. Hence, the address 129.240.2.3 could now belong to a network
designated 129.240.2/ which excluded 129.240.2.214, whereas both would have to
be a member of the same C-class network previously. Consider the following table
showing this mask and two addresses:
Sub-network address IPv6 addres range
Mask 129.240.2.8/3 10000001.11110000.10.00001{b1 b2b3}
A 129.240.2.1510 10000001.11110000.10.000011112
B 129.240.2.21410 10000001.11110000.10.110101102
A matches the mask, while B does not.
The subnetting concept is itself an abstraction. By this is meant that it is a
method in which to organize networks into zones and hierarchies not mandated
by or reflections of some basic property of IP addressing. As far as the link-layer
directly beneath IP, in whichever form it may be, is concerned, choosing what
frames to forward is merely a matter of medium connectivity. Therefore, another
approach to viewing subnets might be to make the link layer reflect itself in the
network-layer protocol. To avoid a breakdown of the barriers between network
layers, the IPv6 protocol adds support for the concept of the link layer in the shape
of the link.
An IPv6 subnet is essentially a contiguous interval of addresses. This interval
must be of a size on the form 2n. The relationship between links and subnets is
that the link is encompassed by the subnet, and that several links can be contained
in a subnet.
In short, links in essence are an abstraction of the link-layer protocol
services.To quote RC2460 [11]:
link - a communication facility or medium over which nodes can
communicate at the link layer, i.e., the layer immediately below IPv6.
Examples are Ethernets (simple or bridged); PPP links; X.25, Frame
Relay, or ATM networks; and internet (or higher) layer "tunnels", such
as tunnels over IPv4 or IPv6 itself.
An Ethernet network running OSPFv2 will offer the same broadcast “scope”
to all hosts connected to it regardless of addressing semantics. This concept of
“broadcasting scope” or “link scope” is reflected in some crucial changes from
OSPFv2 to OSPFv3, detailed further in this Section. Section 2.5.3 illustrates and
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elaborates on the link concept as it relates to routers in particular. The implications
it has for addressing is discussed here, however, since OSPF routers do not use IP
addresses in the “overlay net” the routers are members of.
IPv6 addresses that are valid only inside the link broadcast scope are referred
to as Link-Local. Link-Local IPv6 addresses are not used for routing purposes,
but are used for more temporary purposes: neighbour discovery, and in an
infrastructureless network, they are used for stateless autoconfiguration (i.e., the
host assigns an address to itself) allowing for temporary networks where only
connections between hosts is of interest. They are always preceded by the address
prefix FE80. For reference, the equivalent class of these addresses in IPv4 are
for instance the 192.168/16 and 10.0/16 subnets. A related concept is the unique
local IPv6 unicast address, usually merely referred to as “local IPv6 addresses”,
previously known as site-local addresses. Preced by the address prefix FC00, these
addresses define networks whose addresses are non-routable globally, like link-
local addresses. Examples of usage may be sensor networks in a factory.
OSPFv3 no longer uses any addressing in its headers - all “OSPF adresses”
are in fact 32-bit router IDs, and routers only know each other by these IDs. This
actually means that OSPF is essentially independent in its operation of the network
protocol it runs across - of course, several allotmens in OSPFv3 accomodates IPv6,
but addressing is not crucial. The actual link state, of course, still consists of IPv6
addresses.
2.4 Central concepts and components
The following section introduces central concepts of OSPF and Link State routing.
It does not need to be read in order as a block to understand the sections it precedes,
but is rather intended to serve as a point of reference for whichever central concept
of LS routing the reader is not familiar with or where doubt arises on the use of
terminology. The Terms and Abbreviations section at the end of the thesis may
also be useful.
2.4.1 Interior and Exterior Gateway Protocols
An Interior Gateway Protocol is a routing protocol designed to operate inside an
Autonomous System 8. The complementary protocol type is that of the Exterior
Gateway Protocol, which consists of those protocols intended to establish routes
between Autonomous Systems. The main example of the latter is BGP. Interior
and Exterior Gateway Protocols exchange routing information depending on the
design of each protocol. In an OSPF AS, this exchange is handled by Autonomous
System Border Routers (ASBR).
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2.4.2 Link State Routing
Link state routing was invented in the late 1970s at Bolt, Beranek & Newman
(BBN). The ambition of the inventors was to provide a more stable routing service
in a network than previous manual routing protocols permitted. Later work at BBN
with Link state routing led to the invention of hierarchical Link state routing.
To say that a routing protocol implements Link state routing, implies that the
router running the protocol has complete knowledge of the entire routing domain.
This knowledge is exchanged between routers in the shape of Link state, which is a
unit of information describing a shared Link between two routers. This information
is collected in Link State Advertisements (see below).
The Link state is aggregated by each router, as a list or database. The Link state
is then used to establish all possible routes in the routing domain in the shape of
a routing table generated with a Shortest Path First algorithm. Routers can obtain
the link state by means of interaction with other routers, either by receiving and
broadcasting periodically emitted messages containing Link State Advertisements,
or alternately, by obtaining the full Link state of a neighbouring router, in the case
of OSPF, by means of Database Descriptor packets. The latter is used when a new
router is discovered in a network.
2.4.3 Distance Vector Routing
Distance Vector routing differs from Link State routing in that routers exchange
actual routing table information instead of merely the Link state used to generate
it. To elaborate; each Link state router creates its routing table by its own internal
processes. The Distance Vector protocol, on the other hand, keeps Link state local
at each router, and propagates routing tables.
Even though OSPF is considered a Link State protocol, it does in fact also use
Distance Vector routing in implementing hierarchical routing.
2.4.4 Link State Advertisement
Link State Advertisements are the OSPF link state data units. They are of a
fixed length. While coalescing LSAs could offer more efficient handling and
transmission, practical experience by the implementors of the original OSPF
protocol dictated that they be kept small. Each LSA contains a set of information
detailing who originated it, its age and sequence number, and the actual link state,
for example in the shape of a route offered by the originating router or the summary
of a network. The LSAs are kept in a database ordered according to their unique
identifiers. The link state contained in them is used by the router in its SPF
calculations.
LSAs are flooded encapsulated in Link State Update packets. The flooding
is ensured by a Link State Acknowledgement. They can be used to synchronize
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the link state of one router with another, on a per-request basis, after the giving
router sends a series of Database Descriptors to the receiving router containing
information about which LSAs it keeps in its database.
Since the structure of LSAs is important to routing protocol security, as they
are the prime vector through which harmful information can enter into the routing
process, they are described in closer detail in Section 2.6.1.
2.4.5 Flooding and neighbor discovery
Flooding a message is, in essence, to re-transmit an incoming packet across all
active interfaces, usually barring the incoming interface. Flooding can be achieved
on all Link types, however, unicast flooding is rather inefficient compared to
broadcast and multicast. By each recipient acknowledging receipt of the flooded
packet, the sender can verify if the flooded packet was received by everyone. In
OSPF, the Link State Ack2.7.2 is used for this purpose.
In essence, this replicates the functionality of a TCP-type connection-oriented
transport protocol. Messages are forwarded on all interfaces, unless those on
which they already have been received, and acknowledged back to the originator
in the same manner. Flooding can either be carried out by means of broadcasting,
multicasting or even by unicast. Flooding is the mechanism which allows routers
to discover each other, exchange routing information, and notify other routers of
changes. Flooding which can be guaranteed - all routers receive the message - is
said to be reliable.
Reliable flooding is the means used to achieve certain delivery of these
messages. The simplest way to describe this process is simply that the router
originating the message to be flooded transmits is to each of its neighbors, who then
transmit further out except on an interface on which the message has been recorded
as arriving. Finally, each recipient acknowledges the receipt if an acknowledgment
has arrived on each of the interfaces on which it has sent the message. The
procedure may seem wasteful, but by tuning the interval before a router forwards
each packet, the overhead redundancy can be trimmed.
On link types without broadcast, neighbour discovery must be carried out by
manual configuration, and are maintained using unicast HELLOs.
2.4.6 Adjacency
Two OSPF routers that mutually synchronize their link state, form an adjacency
with each other. On interface types such as point-to-point, the adjacency follows
the single link between the two hosts. In other network types, where routers
share the medium but are not capable of sending messages to everyone at once,
adjacencies can be configured manually.
In a broadcast network, in which routers are self-configuring, a router arriving
in the network that announces its presence, upon completion of initial link state
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Figure 1: A simple illustration of the OSPF Area system
database synchronization, is said to be fully adjacent with the neighbor router
from which it received the link state. Once full adjacency has been established,
the new router will participate in updating the link state of other routers with
Link State Update packets. The adjacencies can then be thought of as logical
network paths across which Link State Updates and other OSPF control messages
are shared. They form a separate meta-network distinct from the IP network
it uses for transmission; OSPF transmits its information as ’raw’ IP datagrams,
and does not use any higher-level transport protocol. It is easy to see that the
complexity of the amount of overhead traffic associated with link state updates
approaches O(n2) with n being the number of routers. To alleviate this problem,
OSPF permits activation a Designated Router scheme, either self-configuring in a
broadcast network or manually configured in a non-broadcast network.
2.4.7 Areas
For purposes of scalability, the AS may be segmented logically into Areas, of
various types according to their connectivity. For a simple illustration of Areas
in a small network, see Figure 1. Area types are determined according to of which
degree each Area is directly connected to other Areas and external Autonomous
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Systems. Each Area receives a distinct 32-bit number identifying it. The Area
mechanism thus introduces a notion of a two-tier hierarchy into the network. This
allows for link state complexity on the order of O(log(n), where n is the number
of Areas, instead of O(n) (linear complexity). Inside each Area, OSPF works as
a link state protocol, with each router maintaining full state of the entire Area.
However, between Areas, OSPF forwards link state in a fashion more resembling
Distance Vector routing. This surprising fact lies in the Summary LSAs that are
exchanged between Area Border Routers. The structure and origin of these closely
align with how RIP builds routes [30]. It is for this reason that there may only be
one backbone Area - with more than one, there would be several redundant paths,
which could hurt DV convergence, in particular by making the count-to-infinity
scenario possible. However, with the Backbone forming a hub between all Areas,
this is effectively prevented.
The size of Areas can vary considerably between the recommendations given
by vendors; establishing link state for an Area has complexityO(i ∗ log(n)), where
i is the number of interfaces and n routers, and essentially the number of routers
in an Area is mainly constrained by the memory and CPU of the routers in it. An
Area of 500 routers is not unheard of, but the recommended number can dwindle
to as low as 50. [30].
The Area of central importance is the Backbone Area, always designated as
number 0. Every Area-segmented OSPF network is built around this backbone,
over which routing information is dissipated between routers in all the Areas of
the Autonomous System. All Areas need to have an interface to the Backbone
in a correctly configured OSPF network. If the Backbone Area cannot physically
connect directly to an Area in the AS, a Virtual Link can be configured through
another Area in order to reach it, acting as a packet tunnel. Virtual Links are
regarded as Areas in their own right.
The typical area, in [30] simply called Normal Area, can be placed anywhere
within the AS. This standard area type handles all LSA types, which can be a
liability if one wishes to lower the amount of routing traffic overhead to a minimum
in a dedicated Area. For this reason, three other Area types have been implemented
that allow for more narrow link state propagation, reducing processing and link
resouce usage.
These other three Area types apart from the backbone, normal areas and Virtual
Links, are SA, TSA and NSSA, respectively meaning Stubby Areas, Totally-stubby
Areas and Not-so-stubby Areas. Each is described in terms of their connectivity
to other Areas or other Autonomous Systems. Dividing each Area is one or more
border routers, described below.
The Stubby Area offers no routes that are not OSPFv3-generated routes, as it is
connected to OSPF areas only, effectively meaning that any packet originating from
a host inside the Area intended for an IP address outside of it, will be transmitted on
the default, or “last-resort”, route. A Stubby Area will receive routing information
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from other OSPFv3 Areas from the Backbone. It is the Area type which demands
the least in terms of memory and CPU of its routers, hence LSA packets from
outside the AS are not forwarded into the Stubby Area. A Stubby Area therefore
cannot provide Virtual Links through itself, and so must be placed as “leaves” on
the Area map.
Conversely, the Totally-stubby Area does not receive or transmit any routing
information to or from other Areas. Its only external route is the default route.
This austerity puts constraints on the forwarding delays of packets originating in
this Area, making it an Area type that is only used when overhead in link and
memory must be kept at an absolute minimum.
A slight extension of the Stubby Area, the Not-so-stubby Area can receive,
and propagate to the Backbone Area, some routing information from other external
Autonomous Systems. This permits the NSSA to receive routing information for
example from an RIP domain through an ASBR at its boundary and propagate this
further into the OSPF AS. However, the NSSA like the SA and TSA still cannot
support Virtual Links through it.
The Area scheme of OSPF is complex. Its advantages, though, are
indispensable: they provide the possibility of a hierarchically ordered network,
where only the routing information necessary for each Area is broadcast within
it, but at the price of a reduction in optimality of packet routes. As network size
increases, this leads to a significant reduction in network overhead in total, while
delays are considered an acceptable trade-off. Combined with the Designated
Router scheme and the wide support of different interface types, this makes OSPF
an adaptable and versatile protocol, as its wide adoption is further testament to.
There are also other advantages: robustness increases as link failures or router
faults are contained within each Area, the tendency to prefer intra-Area routes
adds to this robustness. Additionally, since the Summary LSA can be configured to
hide IP address ranges, subnets/links can be closed off to other Areas for security
reasons.
OSPF at the inter-area level works, as mentioned, in a fashion similar to
Distance Vector routing2.4.2. The basic cornerstone is the Summary LSA,
described in detail further below. In short, the Summary LSA contains the ID of
the originating router, and an IP address range and netmask detailing the addresses
that are assigned to the Area the router represents.
2.4.8 Virtual links
Virtual links might be referred to as extensions of the Backbone Area across other




Routers in OSPFv3 are categorized as AS boundary routers (ASBR), Area border
routers (ABR), and internal routers. Internal routers are only connected to
one area, whereas Area border routers and Autonomous System border routers
respectively maintain connections to several areas, and several Autonomous
Systems. The ASBR is particular in that it can process and introduce link
state received from non-OSPF protocols, in effect usually BGP (Border Gateway
Protocol), the routing protocol that essentially connects the Internet.
Area border routers may also be specified as backbone routers, connecting it
to other backbone routers, although this implication doesn’t go the other way: a
dedicated backbone router may exist which is not an Area Border Router.
Routers form specific relationships with each other, determining the activity
between them. The “two-way” neighbor state indicates that a Hello packet has
been received in both ends, marking a mutual discovery. The “exchange” and “full”
states are used during and after initial database synchronization, respectively, while
a missing “Hello” packet will result in a “down” state.
2.5 Links, interfaces and flooding scopes
The three above terms, already mentioned in various contexts, deserve a more
thorough treatment on their own. They are related to each other in a sense which
greatly influences how OSPFv3 accumulates, dissipates and organizes link state.
2.5.1 The interface
In OSPFv2, an interface is a logical assembly of a physical network adapter, an
adress range, various transmission parameters such as Minimum Transmission Unit
size (MTU) and Hello interval, Area type, Designated Router ID, and the interface
type and state. The state can for instance be up, down, or loopback, while the
interface types are described below.
The interface type describes the characteristics of the network the interface
connects to. As mentioned, the OSPF-MANET strives to standardize an interface
type that matches this kind of network in which the medium offers multiple access
and unreliable broadcasting due to the nature of wireless communications. The
most common interface type is broadcast2.5.3. Other interface types have little
impact on this thesis and will only be mentioned briefly. It is worth noting that a
MANET-enabled OSPF implementation will also support these other interfaces.
The interface type is important for the way the OSPF instance operates - across
an NBMA interface, for instance, HELLO messages will be transmitted to each
router on the interface in turn instead of multicast. This necessitates a longer
HELLO interval. Conversely, a Broadcast type interface will see more frequent
HELLO emits.
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Figure 2: The relationship between Links and Subnets in IPv6
2.5.2 Instances
OSPFv3 elaborates further upon OSPFv2 by adding support for multiple instances
for each link. The result of this is that a broadcast link, for example, may support
several routing domains. A typical case could be two sets of routers that separately
form two routing domains (Areas) while at the same time sharing the same Ethernet
network. The routers differentiate between instances by a 32-bit integer contained
in the OSPF header. The alternative to this scheme would under OSPFv2 be for
instance to set authentication keys differently for each Area - but this is a hack at
best, since all routers constantly would be logging failed authentication attempts.
2.5.3 Links
In short, the interface connects the routing process with a network, or, more
precisely, a subnet. OSPFv3, operating under IPv6 with its addressing scheme,
consequently dispenses with the subnet terminology from interface descriptions,
replacing it with IPv6 links. A link, as described in the IPv6 subsection, is one or
several subnets which share a common medium, broadcast or not. The relationship
between areas and links is not necessarily one-to-one; a link may for instance
belong to two OSPF areas, should this be desired.
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Figure 2 shows the relationship between links and subnets. Five routers share
four mutual links within the confine of one Area. These four links map to three
distinct subnets within the Area.
The introduction of the link semantic to OSPF has necessitated a new type of
LSA, the Link LSA. This LSA serves the purpose of neighbour discovery on the
link, alerting other routers about which IPv6 address prefixes associated with the
link, and it provides Option bits used for the Network LSA.
Links (or interface) types are assigned according to the properties of the
network, with the same types retained from version 2 to 3. These are each given
their own sections for completeness, since they vary widely in how security is
concerned.
2.5.4 The broadcast link
The defining feature of a subnetwork (Area) to which the router interface is set
to the broadcast type is that a packet emitted on that interface will be heard by
all hosts on the subnet. The broadcast feature is therefore a function of the link
layer being able to filter packets with specific link layer addresses from those with
a specific broadcasting address. On Ethernet, this address is simply the highest
possible 48-bit hexadecimal number (0xFFF...). An Ethernet adapter will accept
packets with either its own or the broadcast address. Additionally, some networks
and notably Etherner use a third addressing method, multicast, in which interfaces
are programmed to accept a specific subgroup of addresses, enabling the possibility
of defining “groups” of interfaces. Ethernet defines two such adresses relevant for
OSPF, “AllSPFRouters” and “AllDRouters”.
2.5.5 Designated routers
An important concept in OSPFv3 link types which permits more than two routers
on the link, is that of the Designated Router, or DR. In the DR scheme, each Area
either elects for itself one DR and one Backup DR for redundance, or the DR and
BDR are configured manually on non-broadcast link types. The DR functions as
the authoritative source of updates to the link state databases of the routers in its
Area, receiving all Link State Updates, performing the SPF calculations and then
using LSAs to all the routers in the Area as well as border routers in other Areas
to propagate the new link state. The link state database is updated and distributed
as normal. All “internal” routers in the Area form adjacencies with the DR and the
BDR, and its Backup DR, and only these, while other routers at Area borders will
also maintain other adjacencies.
The Designated Router, therefore, is a concept removed from the router types
(ABR, ASBR and so on) listed previously; a router being elected a DR does not
specify exactly its connectivity to other routing domains/Areas, except that it must
have a link instance connected to the Backbone Area.
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The DRs in the AS form a Connected Dominating Set (CDS) for the entire AS,
and each DR forms a single-vertex CDS inside its own area. Take note that this
means that the CDS graph edges do not represent actual physical connectedness,
or point-to-point network links, but rather adjacencies.
An important consequence of the DR system, is that on a broadcast network
like Ethernet the traffic associated with exchanging routing information between
routers is severely reduced: if every router were to build its own routing
information and transmit to everyone else over broadcast, the amount of traffic
associated would approach n2, for n routers. Using DRs reduce this complexity
to 2n, as only the DR and BDR transmit routing information. Furthermore, it
greatly reduces the processing and memory required for computing the LSDB.
The implication of this is that the DR scheme allows OSPF networks to scale more
easily, especially in conjunction with the Area scheme.
The Designated Router is elected according to a scheme which uses a
configurable priority weighting, ranging between 0 and 255, which is contained in
the OSPFv3 Hello packet headers that each router transmits. A weight of 0 implies
that the router may not be a DR at all. Ties are settled by selecting the router that
either has the highest router ID (a value determined either by the highest loopback
ID on the router), or by the highest IP address amongst its interfaces. The second
place router is selected as a backup DR.
Two noteworthy limitations of the DR scheme are firstly that it depends upon
the network to be one which permits only bidirectional links, to ensure reliable
link state update dissipation, secondly that it must be restricted to networks using
a Broadcast Interface type on its routers.
2.5.6 Non-broadcast Multiple Access and Point-to-multipoint link type
NBMA links support more than two routers per link, unlike point-to-point, but
lack the ability to broadcast packets. Examples of network link types that are
supported by this link type are X.25 and ATM. Essentially, the link consists of
circuits between each router.
The point-to-multipoint link type likewise does not have a broadcast capability,
but unlike NBMAdoes not assume that all routers are one hop away. Originally this
interface type was intended for ’cloud’ subnetworks, like a Frame Relay network.
Because of its connectivity limitations, P-MP interfaces do not elect a DR; instead,
the Hello protocol is used for neighbour discovery only. All routers are adjacent to
all others.
At the start of radio link networks being deployed, it was assumed that the
P-MP interface type would be sufficient for accomodating the limitations in con-
nectivity caused by the medium, such as line-of-sight or hidden nodes. However,
in practice, the lack of broadcast implied that neighbor discovery and maintenance
was exceedlingly costly as network sizes grew, consuming unacceptable levels of
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resources from already constrained wireless links. Additionally, they lack a DR
mechanism since DR election convergence cannot be guaranteed under such cir-
cumstances, increasing the number of adjacencies. These limitations are the main
concerns adressed by the introduction of the OSPF-MANET wireless interface
type, discussed in a separate section.
2.5.7 Flooding scopes in IPv6
Since IPv6 introduces new addressing semantics which permit a different kind
of packet flooding, three new flooding scopes have been introduced for OSPFv3.
These are the Link, Area, and Autonomous System flooding scopes. The first type
will only flood packets within a single Link, and an LSA originated by a router will
be resent on all Links the router is a member of; they are never forwarded beyond
the Link.
The Area flooding scope will likewise keep packets within the Area on which
they are emitted. Router LSAs will be flooded on the Area scope. The LSAs
usually flooded with this scope serve to inform other routers about the address
prefixes associated with the Link, and announce the link-local addresses of the
router originating them. The link-local address of a router is only used to forward
packets across one hop, and so they need not be flooded beyond the Link, since all
routers on a Link can hear each other.
The AS flooding scope will flood LSAs to all routers in the Autonomous
System across the Backbone Area. The common type of LSAs to be flooded with
this scope are External LSAs.
2.5.8 Point-to-point Link type
The point-to-point link type is quite simply a PPP line or similar connecting only
two hosts. All configuration is manual, and periodic HELLO messages assert that
the link is working. These links are not included in any closer study in this thesis,
as their security is guaranteed as long as the keying procedure and host integrity is
secure. It is listed here merely for the sake of completeness.
2.5.9 Proposed OSPFv2 Wireless Link (Interface) type
An IETF Draft [1], last expired in November 2005, suggests adding a Link type
(in OSPFv2 parlance, Interface type) which merits mention in this thesis, as it can
be seen in conjunction with the later sections on the OSPF-MANET candidates.
While not implemented as an RFC, the draft itself is well written and is well worthy
of a read to familiarize those who are used to OSPFv2 semantics to the thoughts
motivating OSPF-MANET.
As has been mentioned previously, the wireless interface type must be
compatible with a network in which broadcasting is unreliable, either because
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of line-of-sight, hidden nodes interfering or node mobility, and in which packets
must be assumed to perhaps traverse several hops between hosts - unlike an
infrastructure-based wireless networks, where the access point is always one hop
away. The draft itself mentions that MANET networks are but a subset of the types
of networks with the previously-mentioned properties.
The basic tenets of the proposed interface were as follows:
• Using multicast for reliable flooding
• No DR election
• No adjacency building
This required the addition of a new LSA type, the Link State Flood LSA,
as well as introducing Multi-Point Relays, known from OLSR terminology, for
flooding overhead reduction. Each routers MPR set would be announced using a
Wireless Hello, which would include two-hop neighbour information. Compare
this with the ordinary Hello messages of the existing OSPF link (interface) types,
which only included one-hop neighbours. This information is used for MPR
selection, as each node will keep selecting MPRs until all its two-hop neighbours
are covered by at least one MPR. Since links are not necessarily bidirectional in a
wireless link, only routers with which the host has a two-way link will be electable.
While database synchronization is carried out, it cannot be assumed to be
identical, thereby putting the link (interface) type somewhat at odds with the
classical definition of link-state routing, in which the entire network topology is
common knowledge to all routers. This implies also that the adjacency concept is
redundant on the wireless link type.
The wireless link type has not been introduced into OSPFv3. Instead, the
OSPF-MANET working group is attempting to standardize an interface type
which will fulfill the same functionality. A separate section is dedicated to these
proposals, and these are the subject of the security discussion which concludes the
thesis.
2.6 The OSPF process
The internal operation of an OSPF router is mainly subject to the dispositions of
the software implementing it and the wishes of the vendor. Certain behavioral
constraints are, naturally, specified by RFC2328/2740; others are configurable.
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2.6.1 When to emit and expect packets
There are three main timers for an OSPF router to maintain. All timers must be
equal in each router. There is no negotiation of timer periods in OSPF networks;
it must be set manually by each administrator. This is a possible problem in a
MANET setting, where autoconfiguration is a virtue and centralized administration
is possibly unavailable. The main timer is the OSPF Packet Timer. As mentioned, it
can be set to ten seconds by default, but a shorter interval will increase convergence
ability in paralell with a rise in overhead.
2.7 How OSPF routers communicate
OSPFv3 uses five packet types for exchanging information between routers, all
transmitted by encapsulation in IPv6 datagrams. The area type in which the packet
originates and the packet type determines to where and in what manner it will
be flooded. The main OSPF packet type for link state exchange is the Link State
Update containing up to several Link State Advertisements, LSA. There are several
types of LSA, each providing various types of link state according to the router type
and Area they are sent from.
The LSA is the basic data structure through which link state is distributed in
the AS between routers, and is also the manner in which the link state is stored in
the Link State Database, synchronization of which between two routers implying
adjecency, as has been mentioned.
An important divergence in LSA handling occured in the process of developing
version 3: an LSA will now not be automatically discarded by a router if it has
an unknown type code. Rather, the router can flood them as link-local (see the
previous section of flooding), or alternately, it can be configured to flood the
LSA in accordance with its flooding scope. While the router will forward the
unknown LSA, it will not add it to its own SPF calculations. This development is
intended to make OSPFv3 networks more accomodating to upgrades, as a subset
of routers added that support some new feature implemented by a new LSA type
can implement this functionality by continued reliance on the LSA being flooded
in spite of not being understood by legacy systems in between.
2.7.1 The OSPFv3 Header
The header below, 24 bytes long, is common to all OSPF packets. A property
of OSPF highly relevant to the routing security auditor is the absolute demand
OSPF places on this header to be well-formed; if any of the fields are outside of
the alloted range, the packet will immediately be discarded. The implications of
this security-wise will be discussed further in the thesis. OSPF packets are, as
mentioned, embedded directly in IP datagrams. The IP header should have TOS
set to 0, specify protocol number 89, and preferrably set the Precedence field in
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the IP header to INC (INternetwork Control) to allow OSPF traffic right-of-way to
ordinary IP data.
The OSPFv3 header, differing from v2, notably includes no IP addresses.
All identifiers are simply unique 32-bit integers, and do not follow IP address
semantics.
2.7.2 Header Structure
01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31
Version (0x03) Type (1-5) Length (Packet plus header)
Router ID
Area ID
Checksum Instance ID Reserved (0x00)
OSPF packet
...
Version is mandated to be set to 3 for all OSPFv3 packets, and length the entire
length of the packet in bytes, as could be assumed. Both the Router ID and Area ID
are 32-bit integers. The router may well be configured to only accept OSPF packets
originating in a specific area, or to only accept those from designated router IDs,
but both fields will initially not precipitate possible discardment at ingress.
The type field must be an integer from 1 to 5, or the packet is discarded. The
types available are:
• Type 1 HELLO packet
• Type 2 Database Descriptor
• Type 3 Link State Request
• Type 4 Link State Update
• Type 5 Link State Ack
Each packet type is described in detail below.
2.7.3 The Header Checksum
Before progressing to the bits and bytes of the various packet types in OSPF, the
checksum should be brought to our attention, as this thesis focuses on routing
security, and checksums are commonly seen as a security feature. This checksum is
the same type as defined for IPv6; the complement of the 16-bit ones complement
sum of the packet. The basic algorithm is as follows:
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1. Order the packet in words (2 bytes)
2. If the length of the packet is not a multiple of 16, pad with 0 at the end
quantum satis
3. Set the Checksum field to 0
4. Add the two first words, with a carry from the HSB to the LSB
5. Proceed to add the resulting one’s complement sum to the next word
6. Once all summation ends, complement the final sum
As we can plainly see, this checksum is not intended to be a cryptographic-
strength checksum - in OSPFv2, this is handled by the variable-length Authentic-
ation field, and in OSPFv3 it is dispensed with entirely in favor of using IPSec.
Rather, it is a continuation of the OSPFv2 practice of including a checksum to cor-
rect transmission errors. Nevertheless, the checksum adds a layer of complexity,
or more correctly, a boundary on the form of OSPF packets to avoid them being
discarded, which may have significance later when the forgery and modification of
OSPF packets is discussed.
2.7.4 Type 1 - The HELLO packet
As mentioned, OSPF bases its operation on routers discovering neighboring
routers, as well as maintaining contact with them periodically. This is accom-
plished using the HELLO packet. These packets are transmitted without forward-
ing at a default of ten second intervals on a broadcast interface. They consist of a
normal OSPF packet header appended by a list of the DR and BDR, a list of routers
from whom HELLOmessages have been received, an interval specifying how long
to wait between HELLO packets, options, and the priority (for DR election) of the
router
An important implication of the HELLO protocol is that changes in the network
topology may not be detected faster than the HELLO packet interval. If a
router does not receive the expected HELLO packet from another router within
a reasonable grace period, typically forty seconds, it will assume that router to
be off-line, set the interface with that router do state “Down”, and notify adjacent
routers.
The HELLO emit interval is an important parameter of OSPF traffic overhead
in a network, along with the size of the HELLO packets, which is fixed in OSPFv3.
2.7.5 Type 2 - Database Descriptor
A complete set of routing information is maintained internally in each router in a
link state routing protocol. In OSPF, this information is organized as a database, the
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link state database. Maintaining this database is a collective effort, as the database
must be kept common to all routers to guarantee reliable routing.
As noted earlier in the document, router adjacency means that routers possess
the same routing information, or link state, and that they will maintain a mutual
relationship of exchanging updates to this information while the adjacency persists.
In OSPFv3, all routers in an area are adjacent on multiaccess links only to
their Designated and Backup Designated Routers. OSPFv3 distributes link state
database information in the shape of DD (Database Descriptor) packets. These
packets, when received, will give the arrived router a “directory listing” of the
entire link state of the router with which it is forming an adjacency. This “listing”
consists of Link State Advertisement headers (see below).
Database Descriptor packets, in short, arrive serially at the receiving host and
are processed to allow it to obtain an overview of the Link State database by the
Link State headers. Thereafter, once the DD synchronization is complete, Link
State Advertisements will be filled in to complete the database according to their
ID and sequence number. The new router itself requests the LSAs it deems it
needs. Routers will also periodically request Link State Advertisements that have
gone stale.
2.7.6 Type 3, 4 and 5: Link State Advertisements, Requests and Acknow-
ledgements
OSPF packet type 4 is the LSU, the Link State Update. It is a packet consisting of
an LSA header, with the appropriate type set, and one Link State Advertisement.
Link State Advertisements are, as mentioned, data units holding information
about an active link between to routers, or even a whole subnetwork, as well as
the identity of the originating router Through reliable flooding the router can make
the assumption that all routers that need to obtain the LSA, eventually will, by
retransmits through neighbouring routers. An important quality of LSA flooding is
that a router may not change the content of an LSA it forwards on behalf of another
router.
Each LSA has a header, separate from the OSPF LSU packet header, which
includes the originating router ID, age, sequence number, and the LSA type. LSA
type is provided in hex, giving the extent of how it is to be flooded in the network,
see Figure 4.
Type 3 and 5, Link State Requests and Link State Acknowledgements, contain
no link state of their own, but merely serve as control packets in the LSA
exchange process. Requests are, in short, a listing of one or more Link State
Advertisements, by ID, the requesting router requires. This can either be because
it is missing in its LS database or because the current LSA has expired after one
hour. Acknowledgements resemble Requests, but confirm receipt.
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Figure 3: The Link State Advertisement Header
OSPFv3 OSPFv2
LSA Type Description LSA Type Description
0x2001 Router 1 Router LSA
0x2002 Network 2 Network
0x2003 Inter-Area Prefix 3 Network summary
0x2004 Inter-Area Router 4 ASBR Summary
0x4005 AS External 5 AS External
0x2006 Group membership 6 Group membership
0x2007 Type 7 7 NSSA External
0x008 Link N/A N/A
0x2009 Intra-Area Prefix N/A N/A
Figure 4: LSA types in OSPFv3 and OSPFv2
Link State Advertisements, to complicate the already somewhat crowded
bestiary of OSPF packet types, are further subdivided into a number of specialized
LSA types according to the type and location of the originating router. A
comprehensive list of Link State Advertisement types is given below. Keep in mind
that the LSU is distinct from the LSA: the latter is encompassed by and carried by
the former, and the former contains no link state.
While Database Descriptors outlines the link state database, Link State
Advertisements are the actual data structure in which link state is held. Link State
Advertisements are identified by a number, address-based and determined by for
instance the originating router or the network from which they arrive. A Link State
Advertisement that arrives from outside the AS will have an ID that is the network
mask of the originating network. Each LSA type has a different scheme for making
these identity numbers. To differentiate between Link State Advertisements with
similar ID, OSPF uses a Sequence Number to differentiate. This Sequence number
is kept as a counter inside each router. It plays a crucial role in ensuring that only
the most recent routing information is admitted into the Link State Database.
A Router LSA, shown in Figure 5, has the ID of the originating router, that
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Figure 5: Router LSA
is, the router which sent it. Each router sends out a Router LSA for each area
it belongs to, containing all links it maintains within that area - its set of active
interfaces and neighbours. Using these, and reliable flooding, each router in the
routing domain can learn the network topology of the OSPF routing domain. Most
Link State Updates in a common multiaccess network will be of this type, and in an
AS where all routers are connected by point-to-point links, the only one, in contrast
to broadcast networks, where network LSAs will be aggregated by these and used
instead by the Designated router.
Network LSAs contains information about each broadcast subnetwork, most
importantly the routers. They are particular to broadcast networks, as they lose
relevance on other non-broadcast interface types. The ID of a Network LSA is the
IP address of the Designated Router. Following this is the advertiser ID,
The OSPF Area system is implemented by type 3-5. Type 3, the Inter-Area
Prefix or Network Summary LSA, is generated by an ABR (Area border router).
These advertisements are a means of distributing routing information from one area
to another. They contain an addressing summary of the entire area using a netmask
that can be used by other networks to infer what address ranges are represented
by the area. These LSAs are the only link state that leaks between Areas. As a
consequence of this, adminitrators may elect to hide prefix ranges from other Areas
if so wished, for instance to create address ranges that are suitable for machines that
require elevated security and should not be visible outside the Area.
Type 4 LSA
Type 5 LSA
Group membership LSAs are not relevant to this thesis. They describe the
members of multicast groups in MOSPF (Multicast OSPF.)
2.7.7 Type 3 - Link State Request
A link state request is a simple packet type, which simply contains a list of LSA
identifiers that the originating router doesn’t have, or which have expired. In this
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LSA Age







Figure 6: Type 3 Network LSA
respect they are almost excactly similar to the Link State ACK.
2.7.8 Type 4 - Link State Update
The Link state update packet contains an LSA, flooded to all routers adjacent to the
DR, which has been altered by a change in link state. In itself, it is of little interest;
it contains Link State Advertisements and is flooded where possible. The LSA
2.7.9 Type 5 - Link State Ack
To ensure reliable flooding of the LSAs across all interfaces, the DR will retransmit
unacknowledged Link state advertisements. This retransmission is unicast to
interfaces which have yet to acknowledge. The acknowledgment must specify the
sequence numbers of the LSA packets. LSA acknowledgment may also take form
of the recipient router returning it in its entirety, if it detects a newer version of the
same LSA is already installed in the LSDB.
2.8 Commentary
OSPF is quite extensive, as has been demonstrated in this section. This is not a
consequence of designer neglect - rather a logical consequence of OSPF being able
to offer the fast convergence, link type versatility, loop-free high-quality routes and
scalability that are its main selling points.
From a security perspective, a high degree of “intricacy” is usually not
considered if not undesireable, then at least not something to strive for in itself.
Implementing software like a routing daemon in a secure manner is complicated,
because security auditing code for potential buffer overflow weaknesses or similar
exploit entry points is costly and demands highly skilled programmers. However,
it is likely in the case of routing protocols that the host security of the system
on which the daemon is to run should be given at least equal attention, since any
attacker with root access on a system can
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3 Adding a MANET interface type to OSPF
A great number of articles and drafts have been authored over the last few years
concerning the demands and contraints, as well as the design and implementation
of, MANET routing protocols. Several protocols have been proposed, with two of
the more successful having been made into formal RFC specifications by the IETF;
OLSR in RFC3626 [9], and AODV in RFC3561 [37]. The former is a Link State
routing protocol, developed from OSPF but substituting the DR mechanism with
an entirely different Multipoint-Relay (MPR) scheme which creates a connected
2-hop graph of the MPR set, while the latter is a distance-vector protocol. Both
have been extensively tested, and several implementations are available.
3.1 Motivations
OSPF has several proven advantages that makes it desirable to adapt an interface
type for it that acknowledges the limitations of MANETs. It is, as mentioned
previously, by now a mature, stable and well-known Internal Gateway Protocol,
with a set of interface types (see above) which makes it versatile and adaptable to a
wide number of currently used network types. There is no inherent property of the
basic link state aggregation and generation scheme of OSPF that forbids it from
being able to operate as a MANET routing protocol.
In a broadcast network, the DR method of distributing link state without undue
overhead, makes OSPF routers converge quickly and efficiently. Open standards
available for router developers to implement. The sum of all these factors, and
more yet, is that OSPFv3 today is the dominating IGP on the market. They also
make the prospect of using it to route traffic inMANETS enticing. The main reason
for this, is that OSPF in an extended, wireless form would be easy to integrate into
an existing OSPF network, as the former envelops the latter. Furthermore, the
strengths that OSPF exhibits in a common multiaccess broadcast-enabled network
may well extend into the realm of MANETs with adaptation: scalability and
overhead reduction.
3.2 Main challenges
Two important problems must be alleviated in a MANET OSPF interface type.
Firstly, flooding of messages must be made reliable in spite of the medium
limitations of non-guaranteed connectivity. Secondly, convergence must be
made to occur faster to accomodate the mobility of the nodes, although without
increasing message overhead to the extent that it suffocates the constrained
medium. The interface type must have some kind of Designated Router scheme,
which may become possible once reliable flooding is provided, because simply
assuming the non-broadcast ability of the Point-to-multipoint interface type will
lead to a prohibitively large amount of adjacencies.
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3.2.1 Adaptation to topology changes
Wireline networks enjoy the benefit of being relatively static. Mobility, when
it occurs, is usually discrete, in the form of micromobility (a node changing its
position within the AS). Routers are generally immobile within the topology, and
are also usually designated and specialized for the task. If a router is moved, it
happens as a planned down-time event. Once it is regains connection to the routing
domain, the neighbor discovery and database synchronization mechanisms ensure
that Link state is built anew. Ensuing LSA updates announce the new router. If the
router needed to move, and change its neighbors, not discretely but continuously,
these mechanisms would correspondingly need to be respond in turn, primarily
by decreasing the intervals between Hello packets, reducing the lifetime of LSAs.
This, however, when implemented, results in often unacceptable overhead: the
majority of packets transmitted over the constrained wireless medium might
become Hello and LSA packets. This is demonstrated clearly in [21].
3.2.2 Connectivity and the Designated Router
When OSPF works across Link types where this mechanism is available, the
Designated Router maintains adjacency with all routers in the Area, making the
DR and backup DR “linchpins”, of the entire system. Even if a one-level “hot-
swap” redundancy exists if the DR is lost, in the shape of the BDR, should both be
lost in short time the consequence would be that routing stagnates while a new
pair is elected. If this happens often, the network will suffer greatly as LSAs
go stale in the non-DR routers. This is not a likely scenario in a well-planned
wireline network - the prudent network administrator will configure and position
his DRs in such a manner so as to minimize the Single-point-of-failure likelyhood,
perhaps even going to the length of separating them both in terms of physical
location and separate sections of the power grid. However, losing both DR and
BDR within a short period of time is very much a possible, if not expected, event,
in a wireless link and especially a MANET. Wireless transmission conditions can
change rapidly with router movement in the shape of interference, line-of-sight and
hidden and exposed nodes. Two-way links can neither be assumed because of the
latter problems. How can we ensure that each router in a wireless MANET will
always have a two-way link to its adjacent DR or BDR?
The point-to-multipoint Link type can fit the non-guaranteed bidirectional
broadcasting of a wireless link, as mentioned in Section 2.5.8, detailing the
proposed OSPFv2 Wireless interface type. While it has not been included in
the official OSPFv2 specification, the thesis introduction mentions other proposals
from the OSPF-MANETWG exist for a Link (interface) type extension to OSPFv3
which address the same issue. These extension proposals will be presented and
compared in the following sections. The three of them are respectively called
Mobile Designated Router, Overlapping Relays, and Multi-point Relays.
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3.3 Two main proposals - Mobile Designated Router, and Overlap-
ping Relays
There are numerous proposals to these problems, but two proposed protocol
extensions of OSPF that address these problems have been selected by the IETF
OSPF working group as the most viable alternatives. They are outlined and
discussed in the following chapter.
3.4 Mobile Designated Router (MDR)
This proposed OSPFv3 MANET interface extension is specified in the Draft [34].
Advantages of the protocol are available in a Draft [35]. It is also documented
further in [21] and in [44]. For the remainder of the thesis it will be reffered to
as OSPF-MDR or MDR. While MDR not only describes the protocol extension
proposal, it also can refer to a role that can be held by a router with such a
Link (interface) active - where applicable the necessary context will be provided
to eliminate ambiguity between the two. In [44] a fully functional simulator
implementation for JSim is available for further study, should that simulation
platform be desired.
3.4.1 Overview
The OSPF-MDR proposal suggests adding an interface for OSPFv3 in which the
DR scheme of the Broadcast interface type adds resilience by allowing for more
than one DR on each link, the set of which is always connected. The DR is under
OSPF-MDR referred to as a Mobile DR, MDR, with the Backup DR being the
Backup Mobile DR, BMDR. Flooding is optimized by restricting flooding to only
(B) MDR routers, and is made reliable by flooding LSAs through adjacencies.
While several DRs exist on the link, each router hails to one DR/BMDR pair
only, effectively partitioning the network between DR/BMDRs, to allow for better
scaling. Since LSAs are flooded across adjacencies, adjacency reduction is
important for performance. Any router on the link will always either be on the
CDS or one hop away from a node in the CDS.
OSPF-MDR differs from OSPF in that Hello packets include two-hop
neighbour information, similar to the OSPF Wireless interface proposal. This
information is used by the router to determine with which DR/BMDR it is to
become adjacent, constructing a Connected Dominating Set (see figure) on the
network.
To an Area outside of the MANET link, possibly containing non-OSPF-MDR
capable routers, the Area will be advertised as a Point-to-Multipoint link, in spite
of the broadcast capability.
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3.4.2 Modifications to the Hello protocol
Differential Hellos allow for overhead reduction. To increase protocol agility,
Hello messages are transmitted every two seconds. By differential Hellos is meant
that the packets only document changes from the previous packet. This provides
a substantial reduction on protocol traffic on the interface. To allow new nodes
to quickly learn the two-hop neighbor status of its neighboring nodes, every third
Hello packet is a full packet. These intervals are configurable if a higher degree of
reactivity is desirable.
3.4.3 The MANET Designated Router
Instead of dispensing with the DR scheme of OSPF and replacing it with an OLSR-
similar AOR set, OSPF-MDR allows for a mobile, general DR, elected in a similar
manner to that of OSPF, but with the provision that an existing MDR is preferred,
to reduce overhead associated with synchronization of the Link State database
whenever a new MDR is elected.
The MDRs are selected in such a manner that they and the adjacencies between
them, forms a Connected Dominating Set that spans the entire network. This CDS
is referred to as the adjacency subgraph. The adjacency subgraph thereby forms a
“backbone” for the link, reducing overhead while ensuring reliability in flooding.
Each node may form either one or several adjacencies with MDRs, referred to
as its parent, making the adjacency subgraph connected or bi-connected. By being
bi-connected, the adjacency subgraph may not be made disconnected by breaking
of one single vertex, making for a stronger and more resilient backbone.
The election procedure, as in the broadcast DR scheme, is according to the
configuration of the router, but combined with information about the two-hop
neighbourhood it senses through the Hello packets.
3.4.4 MDR election
Each node determines whether it should be an MDR. The information it bases
its decision upon, is a comparison for all its neighbors of the set of each router
defined as (MDR Level, Router priority, Router ID). A note should be made on
the description of this procedure in [34], as the ordering method it uses is that of
lexicographic ordering. In short, lexicographic ordering in set theory implies that
given a set (x, y) and a similar set (x’, y’), then (x, y) > (x’, y’) if and only if either
x > x’, or x >= x’ and y >= y’. This implies that if a router has the highest MDR
level of its known neighbors, it will set itself to be the MDR of that group, whereas
if another node has an equal MDR level, then the tie will be settled by comparing
the router priority, and finally the router ID if the tie persists. This is in all respects
similar to the DR election in ordinary OSPF.
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There are three MDR levels; 2, 1 and 0 - respectively indicating the status
of MDR, Backup MDR, and MDR Other. The latter is the general node, which
selects parents from the (backup) MDR set, and does not forward LSA packets on
the incoming interface. This flooding procedure avoids excess flooding.
3.4.5 Flooding
As LSAs are only sent across adjacencies, the MDRs carry out the forwarding.
When an LSA arrives on an OSPF-MDR interface, the router will immediately
retransmit the LSA across the same interface. Backup MDRs will only flood after
it has been determined that a neighbour exists that is not covered by a retransmit.
3.5 Wireless OSPF - Overlapping Relays (OR)
WOSPF-OR is described in detail in the Draft [8]. It extends OSPF with several
important concepts. An implementation in the shape of a Quagga patch has been
completed as of 2006 [22]. It is also documented in [21].
3.5.1 Incremental Hello protocol
The simplest and easiest extension simply consists of reducing the Hello packet
interval markedly, leading to a much faster response to topology changes.
However, this would also naturally imply an increased overhead in an already
resource-constrained network. To alleviate this, WOSPF-OR redefines the Hello
protocol to only include the changed nodes, either absent or newly added, to the
Hello packet neighbor list. It does not compensate for the increased frequency, but
the reduction in overhead is important.
3.5.2 Link Local Signalling
To provide for the extra signalling information required for MANET operation,
LLS has been proposed as an extension of existing OSPF packet formats, with
the proposed data format being the TLV - Type/Length/Value blocks, appended
or “piggy-backed” onto existing OSPF packets. The TLV block is rather simple,
consisting only of a type identifier, the length of the block, and the associated
values. Several TLVs may be appended onto one packet. The LLS system
is completely transparent to legacy OSPF packet protocols, a point of central
importance to the transparent interoperation of WOSPF-OR and OSPFv3.
3.5.3 Overlapping Relays in detail
The specific problem of operating wth Designated Routers on wireless broadcast
or point-to-multipoint interfaces is adressed by the Overlapping Relay scheme. In
short, Link State updates are flooded reliably and efficiently by means of each
router selecting a subset of its neighbors to transmit LSAs, the Active Overlapping
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Relay (AOR) set. This scheme resembles strongly the MPR set of OLSR, and the
purpose of both is similar: to reliably flood LSAs while reducing the redundant
transmissions as close to the possible minimum. OLSR itself enjoys RFC status
from the IETF [9].
The AOR set is built in voluntary nodes. To flag willingness, each router
includes two TLV blocks, both appended to Hello messages. The Willingness
TLV sets the node’s willingness to serve in the AOR set, represented as a value
between 0 and 255, with 128 as the default. The AOR TLV simply sets one of two
bits, called the ’A’ and ’N’ bits, respectively meaning Active and Non-active. Non-
active nodes will not be required to transmit LSAs for their selector, but may be
called upon to do this if all else fails. This distinction permits low-resource nodes to
be spared the processor overhead and battery drainage that constant retransmissions
incur.
Upon determining its AOR set, the node X will first construct a set of all its
neighbors willing to serve as AORs. For each node Y in the candidate AOR
set, X calculates their degree D(y). The degree of an AOR candidate node is
the amount of one-hop neighbors it has, minus the nodes in the candidate set
and X. It compares the neighbors of each node Y, and adds those that provide
the only known route to a neighboring node unreachable from X to the AOR
set, proceeding until all neighbors of nodes in Y have been covered. Finally it
prunes the AOR set by removing as many of the nodes with the lowest willingness
while preserving connectivity. For the OLSR initiate, this scheme may seem
similar to the MPR selection algorithm, and it is. Indeed, one recent WOSPF-OR
implementation (Holter-WOSPF-OR) reuses the source code from a well-known
OLSR implementation for simplicity.
3.5.4 The Non-active Overlay Relay set
Upon reception of an LSA, the router will make a series of tests, each determining
if and when the LSA is to be retransmitted. Firstly, if the router is a part of the
AOR set, it will retransmit immediately. If it is a non-active overlapping relay, it
will still retransmit if no retransmission has been detected within a standoff period.
This ensures reliable flooding even if every node in the AOR set fails. This feature
is where WOSPF-OR departs from OLSR, as the latter provides no “backup” MPR
mechanism, but is crippled if all the nodes in the MPR selector set is disabled.
Essentially, the Non-active OR set is the rest of the nodes not selected to the
AOR, along with those routers that have set the AOR-TLV ’N’ bit. It is worth
noting that retransmission is compulsory for all nodes if necessary. This adds




Another proposal bases itself on the MPR (Multi-Point Relay) mechanism of
OLSR. It is documented in Draft [3]. Along with its dispensal of the Designated
Router mechanism altogether, for reasons stated below, it also extends OSPF at
a very fundemental level by adding an OSPF Interface Type specifically tailor-
made for wireless ad-hoc networks, named the Wireless Interface Type. The
Draft is recently revised, with a working implementation being currently tested
for performance [35].
3.6.1 MPRWireless Interface Type
The MPR Wireless Link (interface) type defines an interface where broadcasting
should be thought of as “half-complete”. That is, only a subset of the routers
neighbors can be assumed to receive the broadcast transmission. This is a close
approximation of real-life transmission conditions in the wireless medium. To
permit adjacency reduction on this interface type, a new kind of flooding scheme
is needed that dispenses with the OSPF method of selecting a DR and Backup DR.
This Link type is similar to the OSPFv2 Wireless Link (Interface) type proposal
described in Section 2.5.8, as well as in a separate Draft [1].
3.6.2 Adjacency management in MPR-OSPF
Two role types exist in an MPR-OSPF network. Similarly to OLSR, these are
MPRs and MPR Selectors. The MPR and its selectors are adjacent to each other,
leading to a high number of adjacencies. A node can, and will usually, assume both
roles; a node is an MPR or an MPR Selector in relation to one other node.
3.6.3 MPR selection
The MPRs are selected similarly to the MPR selection of OLSR and the OR
selection of WOSPF-OR; each node iterates through its neighbor list and selects
MPRs that cover unique two-hop paths, until all two-hop neighbors are covered,
after which the MPR set is again pruned to remove redundancies. Each MPR is
notified by its MPR selectors that it has been chosen. This is a radical difference
from ordinary OSPF, where each router by itself decides whether to become a
DR/BDR, on account of the Hello protocol; the router is elected - not selected.
3.7 Comparison of the proposals
Some amount of debate in the IETF MANET Working group has ensued on the
virtues and faults of the three above proposals. Most of the key issues revolve
around the below topics. Overlapping Relays and Mobile Designated Routers are,
by virtue of their longer history and greater level of progress in terms of simulator
and working implementations, considered widely to be the more viable contenders
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for the interface. OR and MDR were compared extensively in [21] in 2005,
with MDR being recommended for further development as it both demonstrates
a lower degree of overhead by reducing adjacencies compared with a robust
convergence. Both have been demonstrated to show a remarkable reduction in
overhead compared to the existing point-to-multipoint interface, while still offering
strong forwarding and convergence performance. However, scaling is still an issue,
as neither proposal manages to approach O(n2) complexity; that is, the overhead
scales faster than the square of the nodes, as could be hoped for.
While both protocols are comparable in terms of adjacency reduction, it was
consistently found in [46] that MDR provided increasingly optimal routes than OR.
3.7.1 Adjacency management
There is a great deal of concern in the research community as to how adjacencies in
routing protocols in MANET settings may be minimized, for obvious reasons: the
fewer redundant adjacencies, the fewer redundant LSA floodings and consequently
improved network capacity. According to [35], OSPF-MDR has a distinct
advantage over OR in how it reduces these adjacencies.
3.7.2 Performance
Both OR and MDR have been implemented, and have seen extensive testing in
simulation. In the Draft [35] it is shown by simulation how in the setting of a
dense network of 100 nodes within a 500 meter wide square grid, and transmission
range of 250 meters, OR will generate 4 times as many adjacencies as MDR.
This is, if repeatable under test-bed conditions, certainly a major improvement in
overhead reduction. However, criticism of the simulation-only results obtained has
been forthcoming, pointing out that simulations are regarded as good indicators
of the protocol functioning correctly, but poor tools for measuring real-world
performance. The reasoning for this is that simulations, while perfectly executing
the state machines of the routing protocols, omit concerns of performance actors
which are hard or impossible to properly simulate. These include human-generated
radio noise compromising frame transmission, variations in vendor equipment
in terms of buffer sizes, coding or even protocol implementation, chaotic traffic
patterns and realistic mobility models.
This is likely to remain a central point of contention, as the protocol that can
boast the better performance will be regarded favourably when selecting a standard
for a routing protocol for use in the resource-constrained world of MANETs.
3.8 How OSPF-MANET proposals differ from existing OSPFv3 Link
types
The new Link (interface) type will not, as has been stated, completely redesign the
OSPFv3 protocol as it is documented now. The basic operating principles it abides
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Change MDR OR
SPF calculation Yes, but within standard No
LSA types Yes No
Extend OSPF header No Yes
Figure 7: MDR and OR changes to OSPFv3
by - Link State routing, LS database, Shortest-Path First route calculations, Area
hierarchy - remain pillars.
MDR dispenses with the Network Summary LSA, as it has no meaning
in a MANET, instead substituting it with an extension of the Router LSA
which describes its immediate neighbors, to a variable degree: at the strictest
configuration, the MDR Router LSA only includes the neighbouring routers to
which the originator has a full adjacency.
OR, on the other hand, suggests adding a new TLV (Type, Length, Value) block
to the OSPFv3 header, indicated using LLS (Link Local Signalling) in the header
to signify that extensions are present. These extensions may be ignored by non-
OR routers, providing backwards compatibility. These extensions to the header are
used for the particular signalling used by OR routers. The OSPFv3 LSA catalogue
is kept intact without additions, and are used to forward Link state on the MANET
interface.
Under MDR, the Shortest Path First algorithm is somewhat altered, in that it,
to quote [34],
“allows any routable neighbor to be a next hop to a destination. We
note, however, that RFC 2328 [authors note: OSPFv2 standard, see
[31]] also allows a non-adjacent neighbor to be a next hop, if both
routers are fully adjacent to the DR of a broadcast network. Allowing
any routable neighbor to be a next hop is a generalization of this
condition to multihop wireless networks.”
As such, MDR does place a constraint on the internal state of the OSPF
router, but not in a manner which puts it directly at odds with its standards
specification. This would likely be a benefit to vendors reluctant to completely
rework complicated implementation details.
Differential Hello signalling is a common feature of all. OR uses Link Local
Signalling to indicate if a neighbor has been dropped from the neighbor list.
3.9 Concluding remarks on OSPF-MANET
Currently, MDR and OR seem set to remain the top contenders for the standardized
proposed by the MANETWorking group. There is some discussion on whether one
or two standards should be proposed; opponents of this option point out that the
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charter of the WG is to create one proposal, and that the lack of a general protocol
interface extension that can function in all MANET scenarios is also contrary to the
intentions behind creating the WG. This thesis chooses to direct its efforts towards
the OSPF-MDR proposal.
MDR has been shown in [21] to provide more optimal routes than OR in a
variety of simulation scenarios, while at the same time having decent overhead
reduction by keeping adjacencies at a minimum.
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4 Security services, IPSec and wireless network security
“Security” is a word with a large number of connotations, but for which many
definitions may apply. Some attention should be afforded to define what is meant
by such terms as computer security, network security, routing security, and indeed,
security as a whole.
4.1 Cryptographic security services
Security services are in short those mechanisms which any system can offer to
prevent, detect and recover from attacks. When the assets to be protected are
information, or part of an information infrastructure, the security services are
mainly provided by cryptographic means.
The IETF provides an Internet Security Glossary, which offers generally
accepted definitions of the specific security services in terms of which goal each
is intended to achieve. In addition, the IEEE X.800 specification offers a more
specific classification of services. However, for reasons of the extended use of
RFCs which this thesis supports itself on, using an IETF publication for these
definitions is probably the better, if more general in nature.
The following definitions are all provided by RFC4949 [45]. While Digital
signatures and Non-repudiation are often grouped as security services, they will be
treated separately.
• Data confidentiality
"The property that information is not made available or disclosed
to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes [i.e., to any
unauthorized system entity]." (...) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this
term as a synonym for "privacy", which is a different concept.
• Data integrity
(I) The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or
lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner. (See: data integrity
service.)
(O) "The property that information has not been modified or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) Deals with constancy of and confidence in data values, not
with the information that the values represent (see: correctness




(I) The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a
system entity. (See: authenticate, authentication exchange,
authentication information, credential, data origin authentication,
peer entity authentication.)
(C) An authentication process consists of two steps:
1. Identification step: Presenting an identifier to the security
system. (Identifiers should be assigned carefully, because
authenticated identities are the basis for other security services,
such as access control service.)
2. Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication
information that corroborates the binding between the entity and
the identifier. (See: verification.)
(C) See: ("relationship between data integrity service and
authentication services" under) data integrity service.
The foremost security services relevant to routing protocols are data integrity
and authentication. Without the former, no LSA can be trusted not to have been
altered in transit. Without the latter, the assuredness that the authenticated router is
in possession of a secret key - a weak form of identity.
Data confidentiality is likely more relevant to the domain of User data security
[20].
Another often-referenced security service is availability, or the ability to resist
Denial-of-Service attacks. This security service is somewhat particular compared
to integrity, confidentiality and the like. The reason is that it isn’t really produced
by cryptographic algorithms, but by management, planning, provisioning and,
most importantly, by the other security services: if all data transmitted in a session
is intentionally corrupted, leading to checksum failures and subsequent packet
drops, then that session is lacking availability. That session then must employ
integrity and perhaps also authentication to return availability to itself. Availability,
then, is not analogous to authorization, which is the more precise security service
of regulating access to a system, denying anyone who is not permitted such access
and permitting anyone who is allowed. A system can include a multi-user operating
system, or the system itself is a physical lock such as a code lock on a door.
Several security protocols implement one or several of these security services.
The main security protocol operating on the network IP layer is IPSec. Other
notable security protocols are 802.11i, offering link layer confidentiality and other
services for the IEEE 802.11 wireless network standard, and TLS, operating at the
transport (TCP) layer.
4.2 Definitions
The word ’security’ comes from Latin securitas, ’that which assures something’,
’guarantee’, or even tranquilitas animi - ’peace of mind’. We could extend
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this definition, then, to define security as, “that which assures us that unwanted
events do not occur”. This is one of its classical definitions. It certainly does
encompass our desired routing protocol behaviour. But the question remains if we
are better served by a stricter definition. The connotations that the word ’security’
itself have with most computer scientists are connected to illegitimate, illegal or
malevolent activities and intentions. So, by narrowing our definition, and adding
the provision of security being a continuous effort against ever new threats and
attacks, security could be said to be “that which acts against malevolent activities
occuring”. We now have a more useful starting point that excludes the myriad of
ways in which computer systems can be subjected to unwanted (such as Byzantine)
events. Securing something means to modify it in such a manner that it may be
called secure, or having the property of security.
There are, as mentioned in the introduction, three main security disciplines
which this thesis concerns itself with, aside from the umbrella term of Information
Security. These are host, network and routing security. The two latter are intimately
connected, but there are also strong connections between host and routing security.
These are not explored in-depth in this thesis, but consider the prospect of a rootkit
offering an attacker full, undetectable control of a central network router in a very
large and important network of strategic importance.
• Computer (Host) security - The discipline of securing a computer system,
both its hardware component and the software it executes.
• Network security - The discipline of securing a computer network, both the
hardware and software of its dedicated nodes, across all end-to-end network
protocol layers, thereby protecting the integrity and confidentiality of the
data transmitted over the network itself and assuring network operation and
the availability of services the network provides. End-to-end implies that the
protocol layer interacts with a correspondent across a link.
• Routing security - The subdiscipline of network security that seeks to permit
the routing services of the network to operate securely.
4.2.1 A note on User data security
User data security is centered on the end user, the receiver of the services provided
by the host and the networks it is connected to. It does not imply that system
administrators have confidence in their users never doing unwanted things. Rather,
user security borrows from other security disciplines: computer (host) security
offers local protection of application memory space and files on disks, for instance,
while network security offers confidentiality of user data during transmission,
authorization (user access control), authentication and digital signatures. In an
802.11 wireless network, user security can be assisted by link-layer encryption
protocols like 802.11i implemented as for instance WPA supported by key handling
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by the TKIP protocol, and by network access control (NAC) mechanisms like
802.11x or PacketFence. In short, user security focuses on protection of user data
first and foremost.
The confidentiality and integrity of user data is not critical to routing protocol
operation. It is therefore important to distinguish between routing data and
user data, as the difference in their security requirements is reflected in the
cost in terms of memory, computational resources, and network overhead that
must be comitted to meet them. Under any circumstance, the wireless networks
seen as the typical application of an OSPF-MANET interface usually have good
confidentiality services implemented at the link level, notably 802.11, which offers
strong cryptographical protection of link layer frames using the WPA protocol,
especially with TKIP keying activated. When keying is unavailable, higher-layer
services such as IPSec or TLS at the transport layer should be employed.
In spite of this, it should be noted that routing information confidentiality
in certain applications becomes a concern [32] [23]. The foremost example of
this would be in a military tactical setting where an enemy is able to eavesdrop
on routing information in a tactical network. As all who have some knowledge
of military intelligence is aware of, the main method by which intelligence is
produced is by aggregation of minor, non-critical pieces of information into a
whole which adds up to provide more information than the sum of its individual
components. Routing state could very well provide such a source of information:
notably, establishing the identity of a highly adjacent router in a link state network
can serve as a strong indication that the router is located at a Command and Control
site, or, alternatively in the case of a Distance Vector algorithm, repeated Route
Requests for a specific host could pinpoint it as a potential HQ site worthy of closer
scrutiny. Willingness to be elected an MDR on an OSPF-MDR link can, when set
to a very low value, possibly be perceived as an indication of a radio site which
expects to see a large amount of mobility, or which has a low battery capacity or a
low-gain antenna. The presence of these assumptions together could be interpreted
to coincide with, for instance, a node carried by a reconnaissance patrol if its Hello
messages have a higher than normal rate of changes in their MDR field. In such a
way, a routing protocol whose state is not protected to offer confidentiality can act
as an information leakage for the benefit of enemy intelligence efforts.
4.3 IPSec
The purpose of the IPSec security architecture is to provide the security services
of authentication, confidentiality, integrity control and non-repudiation, replay
protection and some amount of confidentiality to traffic flows to IPv4 and IPv6,
the network layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. The main advantage gained by
this approach, rather than making security an application or transport level issue,
is the transparency provided to the application layers, avoiding costly and difficult
re-implementation. In addition, IPSec defines cryptographic keying protocols.
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IPSec was first described in RFCs 1825-1829 in 1995, and was subject to a
complete redesign in 1998 with RFC2401-2412, which nonetheless retains the
basic concepts of the first. A third update came with RFC4301 through 4309.
The last update does little more than provide an additional keying mechanism. The
first generation is mutually incompatible with second and third.
Two modes of operation are defined for IPSec; Transport and Tunnel. The
distinction is that while Transport mode IPSec is encompassed by the IP header, as
only the payload is subject to full protection, Tunnel mode encapsulates the entire
IP packet. Their respective uses generally consist of end-to-end communication
between hosts, and secure tunneling between two separated trusted domain, across
an untrusted domain. The latter is generally put to use in the shape of VPN - Virtual
Private Networks.
As a protocol suite, IPSec defines two protocols for packet security, Encapsu-
lating Security Payload and Authentication (ESP and AH). Their differences lie in
what security services they offer, and to what extent they encompass the protected
packet when run in transport or tunnel mode. Authentication Header is intended to
function as a protocol for offering authentication and integrity, while ESP is inten-
ded to offer confidentiality. Numerous suggestions have been made that AH is itself
encompassed by ESP running a Null-Encryption scheme, and as such is redundant.
Counterarguments that payload inspection is at best risky using Null encryption
have been made, but the two protocols nevertheless continue to co-exist.
4.3.1 How IPSec works
IPSec relies on the concept of the Security Association, SA, between two nodes.
A traffic flow in one direction using one security service uses one SA. This implies
that an IPSec session involving two nodes desiring authentication and integrity
need to create four SAs. The SA itself consists of a cryptographics key, an
identifier of the cryptographic algorithm to be used, and any parameters for the
algorithm. The details of IPSec SA negotiation are usually best left with the
protocol specifications. The important part to notice is that the negotiation of an
SA can only occur between two hosts, and that it cannot be duplicated. In other
words, if hosts A and B negotiate SAab, it is impossible for host C to negotiate an
SA called SAac or SAbc which is equivalent to and interchangeable with SAab.
IPSec offers automated, dynamic key management. More on this is provided
in the next section.
What services IPSec is to offer to which packets is detailed in the Security
Policy Database (SPD), which specifies whether an incoming or outgoing IP
packet should be protected, discarded or bypass IPSec entirely. In the case of
the SPD stating that the packet is to be protected, the SPD must also provide
the protocol, mode, algorithm and appropriate parameters necessary, or provide
a link to a corresponding entry in the Security Association Database (SAD). The
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Nr. Src Dst Protocol Action
1 any any SNMP discard
2 any any TCP bypass
Figure 8: A small SPD
SAD consists of Security Associations, which again are constructed of a 32-bit
unique identifier, a 64-bit (32-bit optional) sequence counter for replay protection
in conjunction with a parameter determining the size of the sliding window, and
identifiers for which algorithms to use. Figure 4.3.1 shows a very small example
SPD.
4.3.2 IPSec cryptographic algorithms
The cryptographic algorithms available to IPSec are outlined in RFC4901. Those
that are mandated or recommended (“MUST” and “SHOULD”, as defined by
RFC2119) are 3DES (TripleDES) and AES-128 for encryption, SHA1 for integrity
checking and authentication, and Diffie-Hellmann Group 2 (1024) and Group 14
(2048) for key exchange.
3DES and AES are both block ciphers standardized by the NIST. They cand
both be considered to be computationally secure at the time of writing. The former
algorithm remains computationally secure in spite of efforts in recent years that
have led to successfull cryptanalysis of the DES algorithm by collective efforts.
The keyed hash algorithm SHA-1 has in recent years been subject to strong,
non-partial, non-limited cryptanalysis efforts. One of these in 2005 reduced the
complexity of finding a collision from 280 to 269 [51]. It was improved the same
year to 263 by the same group that achieved the previous result. Further attacks
were made the following year [7] by another research team. As a result of this, the
NIST has announced that it intends to replace SHA-1 with the stronger SHA-2 by
2010. A short discussion on hash function attacks follows in the next section.
4.3.3 Cryptanalysis of hash functions
The authentication algorithms mandated by IPSec are SHA-1, AES-HMAC and
MD5. SHA-1 is mandated, while AES is, again, strongly recommended. MD5 is
optional, but recent years have seen strong cryptanalytic attacks on this algorithm.
This includes preimage attacks, in which a forged plaintext m f orged can be chosen
by the attacker for a plaintext mauthentic such that
H(m f orged) = H(mauthentic)
The second preimage attack is vastly more critical for routing security than
collision attacks. A hash collision is the phenomenon that a random message
mrandom exists for any message mauthentic such that
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H(mrandom) = H(mauthentic)
The main reason for the criticality of pre-image attacks for routing protocols,
is their conservatism in accepting packets: only those who conform exactly to the
standardized norm are normally accepted. Randomized payloads generated with a
collision attacks will be discarded at ingress long before they can exert any damage.
A preimage payload conforming to the protocol, however, represents a potentially
viable threat. However, the fact that the crafted payload also needs to pass the
stringent validation efforts of the routing protocol adds another layer of protection.
4.3.4 IPSec key management
Key management in IPSec is essentially a synonym for SA negotiation. It is
therefore of central importance to how well IPSec works: the cryptographic
algorithms are only as robust as the mechanisms used to distribute their keys
are. The purpose of key management goes beyond merely putting the same
key securely in each host: negotiation of a number of parameters and similar
state is likewise carried out through this process. Handling it manually generally
scales poorly - an SA is a one-way, one-service provider, and as the amount of
SAs rises quickly, so does the amount of work that is needed for manual key
management. IPSec specifies two dynamic key management protocols: IKE(v1),
documented in RFC4901, and IKEv2 in RFC4306. Both use features of protocols
like ISAKMP, Oakley and SKEME, and use public key cryptography based on the
Diffie-Hellman exchange to establish a secure channel across which to negotiate
parameters and exchange keys. IKEv2 is a much simplified IKE(v1); while the first
version has no less than eight different methods to establish the state, with various
(dis)advantages, IKEv2 only has one, four-message exchange. IKEv2 also benefits
from a much stronger protection against DoS attacks than IKE, in that it actually
seeks to affirm as strongly as possible that the corresponding host exists before
beginning CPU and memory-expensive cryptographic calculations. The lack of
such affirmation in IKE has proved to be a powerful DoS exploit.
The default KM protocol specified by RFC4301 is IKEv2 [25]. IKEv2
is far from as complex as IKEv1 [39] [28] [18], and still relies on a Diffie-
Hellman exchange for establishing a secure channel across which to distribute key
information, in whichever form it may have been generated. This DH exchange
forms the first keyset which is then used further by the two hosts of the SA. A
primitive example of a DH exchange can be found in Figure 9. Real-world values
of a and b will at least be 512 bits, and preferrably at least 1024 bits long.
Part A and part B first agree to a prime number p and a base g, the prime
is the modulo of which all calculations will be carried out. Each generates an
integer a and b in secret. A sends B gamodp, while B sends A gbmodp. A then
calculates (gamodp)bmodp and vice versa. Since gab = gba, both parties will have
established the same key. Finding a or b will require to solve the Diffie-Hellman
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Step A Message B
1 <- p = 23, g = 5 ->
2 a = 6 b = 15
3 56mod23 = 8->
4 <- 515mod23 = 19
5 K = K =
(196mod23 = (815mod23 =
2 2
Figure 9: Diffie-Hellman key exchange
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(Hop-by-Hop, Routing, Fragment IPv6 Extension Headers)
Next header Payload length Reserved
Security Parameters Index
Sequence number
Authentication data - variable according to algorithm, multiple of 4 bytes
(Destination options extension header)
TCP/UDP
Payload - variable length
Figure 10: IPSec Authentication Header in Transport mode
problem: given ga and gb, what is gab? This is closely related to the Discrete
Logarithm problem: given gx ≡ amodn, for an n that is the size of a cyclic group,
what is the x that gives a its value? Algorithms exist which reduce the complexity
of finding x, but none approach polynomial time. A more thorough discussion of
the subject is found in [47].
4.3.5 Authentication Header
The authentication header is documented in RFC4302 [26]. Under IPv6, the AH
will be located directly below the IPv6 header in the shape of an Extension Header,
if applicable behind the Hop-by-Hop, Routing (not to be confused with OSPF!)
and Fragment Extension Headers. AH will be announced with procotol number 51
in the preceding header. AH protects certain elements of the IPv6 header, notably
those that are immutable. The latter excludes ToS and Time-to-Live and other
minor fields which are meant to be altered in-transit.
The cryptographic services provided by AH are Data integrity and Authentica-
tion (see [45]).
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(Hop-by-Hop, Routing, Fragment IPv6 Extension Headers)
Next header Payload length Reserved
Security Parameters Index
Sequence number
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(Destination options extension header)
TCP/UDP
Payload - variable length
Figure 11: IPSec Authentication Header in Tunnel mode
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Figure 12: IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload in Transport mode
4.3.6 Encapsulating Security Payload
ESP, protocol number 50 in IPv6, offers the services of Authentication, Integrity
and Confidentiality [45]. It is defined in RFC4303 [27]. A sequence number
scheme offers protection agains replay attacks. These are attacks in which an
intercepted packet is re-transmited by an opponent for some gain.
ESP uses two algorithms for confidentiality; 3DES and AES, both in Cipher-
Block Chaining mode, the latter also available in Counter mode. Only 3DES is
mandated, but in recognition of its advanced age and the advantages of a more
software-oriented algorithm, AES-CBC is strongly recommended, as is AES-CTR.
In addition, a NULL algorithm is electable for when confidentiality is not needed.
ESP does not, unlike AH, protect the IP header.
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(Hop-by-Hop, Routing, Fragment IPv6 Extension Headers)
Security Parameters Index
Sequence number
IPv6 Header - trusted domain
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Padding (0-255 bytes)
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Figure 13: IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload in Tunnel mode
4.4 Wireless network security
Focusing on the MANET as the “Wireless network” depicted here, we see a
number of crucial security issues. Network security aims to offer security services
to network links, protecting user data, ensuring service availability and providing
non-data oriented security services like authorization and digital signatures. This
task certainly becomes harder in a MANET [53], where the wireless link type and
the lack of central monitoring and infrastructure as well as physical exposure and
absence of a certification authority add to the arsenal of the attacker, while doing
little to that of the defender [29]. The lack of a clearly defined border for the
network, in the same sense as a network socket or the plastic jacket of an Ethernet
cable to in a wireline network, demands multiple “lines of defense” [52], not meant
to be encased within each other as “ablative armour” meant to be burnt off slowly,
but each addressing one or a subset of security issues to create solid, gap-free
security. Still, there exist security strong points of MANETs. These include its
very distributed nature, eliminating central Single-points-of-failure [20].
Wireless network security is often thought to revolve around link-layer security,
notably 802.11i protocols such as WPA and TKIP, as well as the issues of physical
layer availability through resistance to signal distortion (jamming).
4.5 Routing security: resilience, fault-tolerance or robustness?
Routing security is commonly seen as a cross-layer problem, in spite of the routing
protocol operating inside or in conjunction with the network layer. As has been
mentioned in the introduction, host security and network security are the two
crucial security disciplines in this regard, with routing security concerning itself
with auditing and improving the security of the processes which constitute the
routing protocol - identifying, assessing and counteracting what [24] refers to as
“General vulnerabilities”.
54
Operating system, or host, security, would concern itself with preventing
usurpation, and maintaining accountability, confidentiality, and authentication
inside the router, in particular while contemporary routers, even minor consumer
models, increasingly take the form a highly specialized server running a multi-
tasking, multi-user OS [50]. Network security adds to routing security by
providing the services of non-repudiation, confidentiality, authentication, resource
availability et al. to the packets transmitted across the link containing user data and
routing information.
What is achieved by routing security? One good summary could be that the
security of a routing protocol is that quality it has which permits it to operate
with adequate performance. Performance of a routing protocol can be, as has
been mentioned, be a product of convergence speed, the quality of routes, and the
amount of overhead, as well as other qualities deemed desirable, such as battery
conservation. These qualities should be assured in a secure routing protocll in
spite of deliberate, malicious attacks against its functioning, which is essentially
establishing and maintaining relationships with other routers, across which to
exchange relevant and correct information permitting routing tables to be built.
For a routing protocol to be called resilient or fault-tolerant or robust, it should
be capable of adequately handling its designated tasks in spite of unforeseen events
occurring to routers, nodes or links. The distinction, then, between routing and
network security becomes difficult to ascertain, as the two are intermingled. One
important difference is that user information security is generally omitted from the
scope of routing security: while the routers themselves need end-to-end security
among themselves for routing information exchange, the protocol in itself does not
offer this service to the ordinary packets routed by means of it, instead deferring
such services to another process or another protocol layer altogether.
The security service primarily employed by routing protocols is authentica-
tion/integrity. The common mode of operation is to embed keyed hashes made
with a common key inside the routing packets; a fresh digest is then computed
on each payload upon reception and compared. The verification that the local and
remote hashes are equal implies that the payload is legitimate: firstly, no unau-
thorized host lacking the key could have created it, nor can it have been modified
in-transit. Naturally, the key use implies some moderate amount of authenticity of
the identity of the host who used it. Looking it at what it accomplishes, the more
natural term to use for this security service is integrity, since this is exactly what it
is intended to protect, but authentication seems to have become the commonplace
term, albeit slightly erroneously, since originator authenticity is only secondary
and less-than optimal using this method.
Judging from the secure routing protocols which have been proposed and
papers on the subject of routing security, confidentiality seems to be given a
secondary priority to authentication/integrity in routing protocols [6] [50]. The
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likely cause of this is the fact that most of the routing information can be deduced
by means other than payload inspection: HELLO messages, for instance, are
broadcast across the medium; a reasonably knowledgeable attacker with access
to the medium can listen freely for packets using for instance protol 89 (OSPF)
using a simple packet sniffer, then parse the payloads and construct a reasonable
network topology. This insight is reflected in the fact that only NULL encryption
is mandated in ESP mode for OSPFv3 as documented in RFC4552 [15].
4.6 MANET routing security
A number of secure MANET routing protocols have been proposed [6].
The MANET, being a relatively recent network model, has been under security
scrutiny from its inception, because of is features of structure and composition:
any node can enter and leave at will, and being a multi-hop environment in which
dedicated routing infrastructure is not assumed, every node should be able to when
needed to participate in the routing process, or indeed any other service needed for
the MANET to offer the desired level of services to the nodes.
There have been efforts into MANET routing security. Without securing
routing protocols, MANET performance can suffer from attacks as routes decline
in quality more rapidly because of mobility and the difficult link conditions.
Most security challenges faced by wireless networks are also applicable to
MANETs, some to a potentially far greater degree. These include the ease of
eavesdropping and physical signal jamming, as well as the physical exposure of
nodes to a hostile environment, such as a battlefield or surroundings that are not
encompassed by any physical security measures. Another important point is that of
resource availability - without ready access to power, nodes are limited to battery
power, and attacks such as mentioned previously can be devised to prevent their
operation by causing undue power drainage.
The unregulated network membership assumed by this thesis compounds these
problems, as an attacker often with ease can enter a malicious node into the link.
4.6.1 Dynamic Key Management in MANETs
In order to function as intended, cryptographic security services need strong keys
which can accomodate their proven weaknesses. MANETs need such security
services because of their more exposed nature, as described in [29] [52] and notably
by Zhou and Haas in 1999 [53].
In particular, IPSec as mandated by RFC4552 needs keys which accomodate
the known security weaknesses of MD5, since this is the weakest cipher available to
AH/ESPwhen operating in accordance with the RFC [15]. Since key distribution in
the wireless medium is vulnerable to eavesdropping, and since nodes in a MANET
should be able to join at will for the duration of the network, including “late-entry
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nodes”, secure and dynamic key distribution is required. There are a number of
works concerned with this problem, notably [20] and [13].
4.6.2 Security strong points of MANETs
As described in [20], one strong security point of MANETs is indeed its distributed,
generalized nature: dispensing with access points and other forms of dedicated
infrastructure removes the possibility of network failure due to centralized single
points-of-failure.
4.6.3 Modes and protocols
While it may seem apparent from IPSec design that routers, including those
operating under OSPFv3, must employ Tunnel mode, this is circumvented by the
fact that OSPF traffic is always local to the AS, with clearly defined borders to other
networks. At these borders, ingress filtering drops IP frames with protocol type set
to 89. In this local perspective, routers become hosts to one another, permitting
the use of transport mode. Tunnel mode nevertheless remains optional, but will
only provide additional security for OSPF compared to Transport if there are fields
in the IP header which are security critical to OSPF. AH and ESP differ further
in whether they offer payload confidentiality. It should be noted that from the
perspective of IPSec, OSPF packets constitute the payload - it does not distinguish
some particular segment designated for “user data”; anything found behind the IP
header is per definition IPSec payload.
It should be noted that there is general agreement that the non-protected IPv6
header under ESP opens up the possibility of a limited replay attack on OSPF [4]
[24] that could cause disruptions in adjacencies, and RFC4552 further states that
manual keying cannot counteract such a replay attack.
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5 Security in OSPF version 2 and 3
Research literature abounds with proposed attacks against routing protocols,
including the big three: OSPF, IEGRP and BGP [4]. The extent to which these have
been implemented in practice varies, but for the major part, they remain theoretical
or confined to test beds. One consequence of this is that routing protocol attacks
have been downplayed in favour of more immediate or easily executed attacks,
such as transport-layer based DoS-attacks or SNMP weaknesses. The more recent
creation of accessible tools to perform such attacks has returned attention to routing
security and routing attacks. Even still, while DNS has suffered several malicious
attacks, few such case studies have appeared on OSPF or even routing protocols in
general, including the notoriously insecure RIP.
5.1 The IETF and routing protocol security
The design process of early routing protocols like RIP rarely if ever paid much
attention to the aspect of security, presumedly not for reasons of negligence on
the side of the designers, but rather as a consequence of the practical realities
of the time: network users were overwhelmingly composed of scientists and
professionals, whom by virtue of professionalism and idealism would not be
assumed to be willing to subvert or sabotage.
As has been mentioned, later years have seen an increase in the attention
being paid to routing security research. The IETF has itself assigned a Working
Group, named RPSEC, to the field, with a charter of determining both the generic
security threats that routing protocols are exposed to, as well as establishing
a documented set of security requirements that can be used by future protocol
designers. Notable publications from the WG are in particular [4], “Generic threats
to routing protocols”, a non-protocol specific attempt at establishing from where,
by whom and with what routing protocol security can be menaced. It is exhaustive,
including a section on potential adversary motivations (routing malfunction with
the intent of sabotage or benefit in the form of financial gain) and capabilities
(medium access, host security subversion). While the RFC is, as mentioned, non-
protocol specific, it limits its scope consciously to that of well-known, implemented
protocols, omitting the vast field that is experimental or suggested protocols,
many of whom are developed specifically to address issues connected to routing
protocol secority (SAODV, ARIADNE). While it documents techniques usable by
an adversary in a routing protocol attack such as packet sniffing and falsification,
it does not itself offer any practical insight into how this might be carried out. A
separate section in this thesis addresses this, by demonstrating some well-known
and universally available tools in use by both network administrators as well as the
illicit hacking community to enact attacks.
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5.2 Threat model
By threat model is meant the circumstances and constraints both attacker and
defender are governed by. Adversary motivations can also be added to the threat
model where needed for completeness.
One common threat model is the Dolev-Yao [12] model, which offers
the attacker the benefit of being able to spoof both recipient and origin
addresses of packets, as well as retrieve, modify, and re-transmit (replay)
messages, but prohibits him sufficient cryptanalytical means to break cryptographic
keys. In essence, under a DY thread model, well-keyed authentication/integrity
mechanisms can defeat adversary attempts at spoofing and modification of packets.
The term “sufficient” in terms of cryptanalysis capacity is a somewhat variable
quantity: while cryptanalyzing an algorithm protecting a message whose contents
are valuable can be wortwhile to the adversary even in the face of weeks of heavy
computation, a routing protocol adversary is limited in his time scope by the
relevance of the routing message as well as such replay mechanisms as may exist
preventing admission of packets not within some timestamp or sequence number
constraint.
Threat models also need to consider the physical protection of nodes, and their
host security level, with the option of usurped nodes under the hidden control of
the attacker taking part in the MANET or the routing process. We can refer to
such usurped nodes as Byzantine nodes, as their behaviour is consistent with the
definition of such nodes.
We should consider the means by which the attacker gains access to the target.
In this case, our target is the MANET whose routing processes we are attempting
to safeguard, hence the attacker will have gained access to the target when a node
controlled by the attacker is within transmission range of at least one node in the
MANET. OSPF packets are intended for AS-only scope, hence an OSPF boundary
router will not admit packets set to protocol type 89 into the AS. This, however,
does not imply that the AS is watertight against external routing information,
potentially harmful, from entering into the system: an ASBR can, of course, still
accumulate and dissipate routing information from other protocols into the AS, in
particular from BGP.
Network security, as an end-to-end guarantor of the integrity and authenticity
e.a. of packets, plays an important part in routing protocol security. Relevant
to this thesis in particular is, of course, IPSec, a network security protocol suite
offering a flexible set of tools that can be used for these purposes. The main alleged
drawback of IPSec in a wireless network remains performance, both in terms of
packet overhead as well as CPU and memory constraints in nodes. To establish the
security level of OSPF in a wireless network, attention must be paid to this issue.
The Byzantine node is one such attack ’vector’, the other is that of an external
attacker moving into the network.
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5.2.1 Byzantine nodes
On October 27, 1980, a network outage in the ARPANET of several hours
occurred. Following recovery, an investigation into the event revealed it to be
caused by an exotic hardware fault in one router: the routing message sequence
number of one peculiar update had been modified by bit dropping, and because of
weaknesses in the detection of bit errors in messages in routers, was transmitted
in three exact copies, but with differing sequence numbers. This resulted in a
network-wide loop in which these three packets were constantly retransmitted
and queued internally in each router, resulting in routers going down due to
processing and memory constraints. The event and its resulting rectifications in
router design is discussed further in [40]. It sparked interest into the subject of
designing routing protocols which could detect and recover from unforeseen events
of a random nature, coined Byzantine events in [38]. According to the latter,
a Byzantine failure is “caused by nodes or links which continue to operate, but
incorrectly.” Furthermore, “A node with a Byzantine failure may corrupt messages,
forge messages, delay messages, or send conflicting messages to different nodes.”
This is contrasted with simple failures, in which the node or link ceases to
operate at all. [38] is widely recognized today as a breaking point in the study
of robustness, and thereby security, of routing protocols, after which this became a
topic of concern during the design process. It introduced design criteria for routing
protocol robustness that were disregarded previously: robustness had to exist in
spite of different router vendors (standards compliance), and had to allow for non-
centralized network management, notably.
Following the publication of [38], computer security experts began to examine
closer the potential for malicious, Byzantine attacks on routing protocols. A
seminal work in this regard was [5], in which notably the RIP protocol, at the
time the leading IGP, was analyzed from a security viewpoint. This identified the
concept of the man-in-the-middle packet modification by means of sending bogus
routing information, diverting traffic through the usurped node for higher-layer
processing and retransmission.
Figure 14 illustrates how a Byzantine node fits in a routing domain. The blue
delineation describes the limits of the AS, and the blue arrows show adjacencies
between routers across various links. One router has been subverted by an attacker,
and an illicit (red) channel exists between the attacker and the usurped node.
Through this illicit channel, the damager can inject information of a harmful nature
into the AS through the adjacencies the Byzantine router shares with its peers.
5.2.2 External nodes
An external node attack is comitted by a node entering into the network. The node
has access to the medium and can listen to link layer communication. It can under
IPv6 participate in link-local network traffic without the need of stateful address
autoconfiguration. The nodes already in the network participating in the routing
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Figure 14: A Byzantine router in an Autonomous System
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process may have been configured with keys manually, or there may have been
some other keying procedure.
Figure 15 depicts a MANET routing domain in which some nodes are in
movement, and where adjacencies are established. The attacker simply moves his
node into radio range, and unlike the Byzantine scenario there is no need for an
illicit, hidden data channel between attacker and node.
This thesis directs its efforts towards MANET routing protocols working in a
threat model where any node can enter the MANET transmission range and join
the network, but in which Byzantine nodes are not assumed. Nodes are moving in
an open terrain, and are exposed physically. Why the need for a distinction? The
reason is mainly that Byzantine node problems heavily involve host security, as an
usurped node and a malfunctioning node both are in a sense indistinguishable for
the network if the malfunctioning node begins to exhibit harmful behaviour. This
means that the scope of the thesis would have to be extended into the host security
of routers. Secondly, the external node attack vector becomes far more likely in a
MANET setting, since the attacker gains a lower threshold for network admittance.
5.3 Active and passive attacks
An Active attack is one where the attacker provides information as part of the
attack, actively interfering with the system. A Passive attack conversely implies
that the attacker in a non-interfering manner eavesdrops for information. The
passive attack can constitute the entire attack in itself, such as an attack on
confidentiality, or as a preparation for an active attack. Amore specific introduction
to some potential active and passive attacks follows here, while a more detailed
review can be found in [16].
5.4 Attacks on routing protocols
This section provides a quick overview of the most commonly referenced
hypothecized and practically implemented attack types on routing protocols,
notably in [50] [24] [49] [4] [36]. Not all are equally relevant to this thesis - the
aim here is to focus on external attacks. In addition the thesis aims to limit itself to
those attacks which target the operation of the routing protocol itself. This leaves
attacks and explout that can only be or are best countered by network and host
security outside of the scope of this thesis. This notably includes attacks that alter
the IPv6 header or disrupts IPv6 functioning [33] or which mandate a subverted or
faulty router (Byzantine node) [40] [38].
5.4.1 Denial-of-Service
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is not one specific attack, as most who know the term
superficially associate it with HTTP-request flooding might assume, but rather a
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Figure 15: External attack into a routing domain
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consequence of numerous attacks. The purpose of a DoS attack is, of course, to
block or limit the access of a node to some crucial network service.
Can DoS be considered an attack type at all? In one sense, no, as DoS could
be thought of as merely a symptom of an underlying “disease” - in this case a
willed attack. However, by regarding availability as a security service on par with
integrity, confidentiality and authentication, DoS in itself can be seen as an attack
type.
5.4.2 Injection of erroneous routing information
An active attack in which the attacking node joins the routing process of the
MANET and seeks to limit its functioning by means of injecting erroneous routing
information, potentially creating the loss of or deficiency of existing network
routes. The attack resembles the act of willfully turning road signs to create detours
in a road network. This attacks forms the basis of black hole/gray hole attacks.
The exact extent of the damage this attack can inflict is a function of the amonut
of detours a packet needs to take due to the false routing information as compared
to the optimized, shortest-path first route that would have otherwise been used, as
well as the time the routing system uses to correct the erroneous route.
5.4.3 Injection of packets damaging the routing process
The actively attacking node once again joins the routing process and injects
a “malformed” packet into the network, but this time, the packet employs
weaknesses in the routing protocol in order to attack either the collective routing
process or the specific routing process of one or more nodes. A highly effective
attack against OSPFv2 has been demonstrated by Vetter, Vang and Wu in [48],
where the injection into an OSPFv2Area of a Linke State Update packet containing
an artificially high Sequence Number in its header caused a testbed network to lose
routing services for times approaching one hour. It would be natural to assume
that this attack can also be performed under OSPFv3, as the sequence number still
exists and has the same limitations. If so, one question is how the increased control
traffic, and thereby faster sequence number rollover, will affect the damage caused
by this attack.
5.4.4 Artificial redirection - black and grey holes
The actively attacking node takes part in the routing process, choosing at the
attackers discretion one or several nodes for which the attacking node advertises
falsely optimal routing metrics to other nodes, leading to the other nodes more
willingly using the attacking node for multihop routes to the attacked nodes. Once
routing to the attacked node or nodes is ’monopolized’, the attacking node is free
to either drop all packets destined to attacked nodes (black hole) or selectively
remove certain packets, either at random or according to the attackers intentions
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Figure 16: Network fragmentation attack
(gray hole). This attack type is particularly suited to reactive MANET routing
protocols [36], including AODV. It could also be considered a Denial-of-Service
attack.
5.4.5 Network fragmentation
By positioning himself in the route graph in such a manner that no path exists in
the graph between the subgraphs A and B, the attacker will enjoy full control of all
traffic between nodes in A and B. It is illustrated in Figure 16.
If the network has a homogenous traffic pattern, the attacker node will have
the possibility to drop or otherwise tamper with approximately half the packets
transmitted. Note that the attacker in the illustration is not a hub in a wheel
structure, with the other routers as spokes: these still can route traffic amongst
themselves without passing through the attacker.
The fragmentation need not concern routes only, but simply adjacencies. In
this manner the attack will not be seen through a route visualization tool, but the
attacker can hamper convergence capabilities.
As we can see in the figure, the attacker node forms a virtual barrier in the
network which he may use to drop or selectively drop packets (see above on black
and grey holes). Another opportunity is to consciously lower forwarding efficiency.
Executing such an attack needs to take into close account the way the attacked
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routing protocol converges. An attacker seeking to partition an AODV network
needs to offer consistently better routes from one side of the partition to the other,
in order both to attain and keep the partition in place. It is far harder to execute in a
link state routing domain, simply because the attacker has no influence over what
other routers announce through LSAs. Therefore, to attempt something akin to a
similar effect in a MANET setting where an LS protocol is running, the attacker
would rather need to move his node into a favourable position, hoping to use range
limitations to his advantage. In practice, this would likely be very difficult if not
impossible. It is likely that this attack type, therefore, is of little danger to OSPF
within each Area. Between Areas, OSPF works in a DV-like fashion, as mentioned
in Section 1.4. The attacker, if in possession of an Area Border Router, could
forge Network Summary LSAs in order to partition the Backbone. No reports of
any attempt at such an attack have been encountered.
5.4.6 Geographical tracing
The attacker has a substantial intelligence resource, and has detailed information
of the physical nodes, including properties like transmission strength and power.
Using this knowledge in conjunction with routing information from an adjacent
Link State Database, as well as physical-layer signals intelligence efforts, the
attacker is able to make educated guesses with varying levels of precision as to
the physical location of nodes. This attack model is mainly relevant to military
battlefield scenarios. To counteract this attack the owner of the network needs to
provide confidentiality to all routing messages, as well as possibly establishing
a virtual network of encrypted tunnels between nodes to provide data stream
confidentiality. The extent of this attack is largely a function of the opponent,
hence it will not be a central attack to this thesis.
5.4.7 Power drainage
This attack ’type’ resembles DoS in that it by itself isn’t really a specific attack as it
is a result of one. The attacker seeks to deny nodes operation by means of inducing
them artificially to waste power at a faste rate. This could be implemented as a
Network fragmentization attack. Perhaps as an analogy to Denial-of-Service, such
attacks could be dubbed “Denial-of-Operation” (DoO). Power drainage attacks are
mainly considered to be effective against sensor networks, because of the assumed
small size of the nodes and their short battery life.
5.5 The OSPF Area mechanism under attack
OSPF offers the administrator the option of partitioning the AS into a series of
discrete Areas, of which the central is the Backbone Area, Area 0. The remaining
Area types are handled earlier in this thesis.
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An attacker wishing to leverage the Area mechanism for an OSPF attack, is to
consider the crucial importance of the Backbone Area. While subverting a Stubby
Area with for instance a Maximum Sequence attack will render that Area useless
for the duration, repeating the same attack inside Area 0 will not only affect the
routers in that Area, but will also provide an effect that prevents efficient routing
of routing information between Areas. In this respect, Area 0 becomes a Single-
point-of-failure.
5.6 OSPFv2 Authentication
As RIP failed to scale to increasing network sizes, its replacements - notably OSPF
- would often be designed with increased concern for robustness and security.
This was not always the case, though, and security of routing protocols often was
implemented by principle of “bolt-on” rather than “bottom-up”. As directly stated
in [48],
A well known fact about many routing protocol designs is that
they only consider simple failures, while security is usually an
afterthought.”
The possibility of malicious Byzantine nodes or of external malicious nodes
entering the routing process are not usually completely left out of the design
process considerations. OSPF, for instance, did consider such possibilities in that
authentication was added. More background material about the creation of OSPF
can found in [30]. While OSPF authentication is generally considered inadequate
today, it still was much better than the complete openness of RIP.
OSPFv2 has been subjected to extensive security and robustness scrutiny, in
accordance with its wide adoption compared to other IGPs. The IETF maintains a
Draft [24] which describes those OSPF security vulnerabilities that are known and
which could be used to disrupt the routing process, classifying them as follows:
• General - vulnerabilities resulting from basic properties of the network and
the routing domain
• Protocol-specific - connected to the actual protocol mechanism, including
OSPF message header modification
• Resource consumption - exhausting the resources of the router to deny their
services to users
• Other protocols - vulnerabilities that arise through interaction with other
protocols, like IP, and other routing protocols, like BGP
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In addition, [50] highlights the OSPFv2 properties of information independ-
ence and hiding. The authors conclude that OSPFv2 is highly robust, and even
provides some measure of built-in security, and three notable OSPFv2 security
strengths are highlighted: information least dependency, the hierarchy of the AS
partitions, and the strong mechanisms OSPFv2 uses to validate a packet upon in-
gress before it is accepted - excluding IP packet scrutiny.
The Draft shows that the security vulnerabilities of OSPFv2 mainly center
around the lack of real authentication and packet integrity without using IPSec,
due to the weak cryptographic authentication in OSPFv2, as well as the danger
of the malicious, authenticated node. The latter can [50] with moderate difficulty
launch a man-in-the-middle attack on an AS by using ICMP routing and router
redirect control messages to announce a malicious node as a shortcut between two
other nodes.
5.7 OSPF Fightback
Fightback is the postulated ability of OSPF to correct erroneous by means of each
router immediately correcting any LSA received which purports to have been sent
out from the router. This effect is merely a documented part of the OSPF protocol;
any router receiving an LSA it sees itself as owner of, will check if it is containing
information at odds with that of its own LSA database. If that is the case, the
protocol assumes the LSA is outdated or damaged in some manner, and that the
router as the data originator is responsible for rectifying the matter. The offending
LSA is thereby flushed from its scope by an immediate flooding of the routers own
LSA, which must be assumed to be the correct one.
The often assumed effect of OSPF fightback is that it represents a self-healing
feature which will quickly correct any erroneous route injection by an external or
Byzantine node, and that thus such attacks will at most have an effect only between
detection of the erroneous packet and broadcasting of the correction, at most the
time interval set by the MinLSInterval.
However, as has been shown in [24], Fight Back can be counteracted by
an attacker by injecting malicious packets periodically at a rate exceeding the
MinLSInterval, typically 5 seconds. Indeed, Fight Back can exacerbate the effects
of an attack by providing some amount of Denial-of-Service due to the potentially
massive amounts of correcting packets generated by the routers for each malicious
packet injected.
5.7.1 Phantom routers
Another very viable method to circumvent fightback is to emit LS Advertisements
for a router that doesn’t exist - a phantom router. A phantom router is normally
a redundant emergency backup router set on standby in a mission-critical routing
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domain to listen for instance to HELLO emits from some router, sharing its state
and traffic, immediately springing into action the moment the HELLO interval is
exceeded. This allows for very low latency in the case of router failure. However,
since a phantom router will not participate actively, its advertisements are still
valid. As such, an erroneous LSA emitted from a phantom router will persist in
the LS database of the routing domain for a duration possibly far longer than the
MinLSInterval - 1 hour is commonly touted as a likely worst-case scenario.
How is a phantom router set up for the purpose of network attacks? By design,
OSPF routers have a relationship akin to a client-server session: packets arrive,
are sent and are acknowledged, with no assumptions made at each router as to
the identity and nature of the correspondent. Simply emitting a HELLO packet
into an AS will immediately start the preparations for establishing an adjacency-
even if this HELLO packet is emitted from for instance nemesis or ash. Whether
establishing said adjacency succeeds or not is merely a question of conforming to
the protocol - which can easily be done by means of automation. For all intents
and purposes, routers act as oracles to each other: as long as answers conform to
what is required by the protocol, adjacencies are established and maintained, and
routing information is exchanged.
5.7.2 Autonomous System protected by barriers between Areas
In the case that an enemy subverts an Area Border Router linking the Area to the
Backbone, the ABR could be configured to emit falsified LS Advertisements into
other Areas without forwarding them into the Area of the offended router. By this
means, fightback can also be circumvented.
5.8 IPSec modes and protocols for OSPFv3
OSPFv3 runs on IPv6 which, as mentioned, mandates IPSec. The exact modes
and protocols to be used for OSPFv3 authentication when activated are described
by RFC4552 [15], and the following section discusses these and the limitations
imposed on them for this particular appliaction. Given that Link layer security
services are insufficient or unsuited to providing OSPFv3 security, it follows that
estimating how secure OSPF-MANET is largely depends on how well it uses IPSec
security services, and thereby on the inherent properties of the IPSec protocol suite
itself.
In short, ESP and Transport mode are mandatory, while AH and Tunnel
mode remain optional. Authentication/Integrity are the only explicit (traffic
confidentiality and replay protection are implicit) security services that are
mandatory; confidentiality is optional. Whenever authentication or confidentiality
are mandated, any and all OSPF packets that are not protected by AH or ESP must
be discarded silently.
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Note that in addition to dropping packets not conforming to the SPD set up
according to RFC4552, it is assumed to be indispensable to OSPF security that
ingress routers drop all incoming OSPF traffic to prevent external attacks. This
is simply done by means of a rule at gateway ingress which filters at IP protocol
type 89 in the IPv6 header. In the case where two IPv6 networks are connected
by an IPv4 header, leading to encapsulation of the IPv6 header, gateway pre-egress
admittance filtering need to be employed.
5.8.1 OSPFv3 IPSec Key Management
RFC4552 specifies key management for IPSec AH and ESP modes when used for
OSPFv3.
Keying must be carried out manually; this is the only keying mechanism
available to OSPFv3. The reason for why automated key distribution with
IKEv1/v2 is not possible for this application, is the multicast nature of OSPF itself:
when OSPF packets are sent over a broadcast interface, the sender will need to have
at least two Security Associations setup individually with all recipients to achieve
authentication using AH, and another two using ESP with confidentiality.
Apart from the management issue of this many Security Associations
with according internal state and setup hassle, the kind of one-to-many key
management would be impossible with the Diffie-Hellman-algorithm that IPSec
key management relies on to establish initial keys, because this algorithm relies on
the random generation of secret integers by each of the parties to the exchange.
Keys are recommended to be changed every 90 days. They must be on a
numerical form, expressed hexadecimally, as ASCII keys lose crucial entropy: by
limiting the available alphabet from which keys are generated, birthday attacks
become exponentially easier. This especially applies in the case of manual keying,
where the suggested keying interval is of such length that reasonable risk must be
assumed of strong cryptanalysis efforts to uncover the key occurring. The RFC
wisely forbids stream ciphers, as these would put the already duration-strained
keys under additional pressure from cryptanalysis - under any circumstance, stream
ciphers are not well suited for this kind of application.
5.8.2 Managing one-to-many security associations
The left hand side of figure 5.8.2 shows the fundamental problem of maintaining
IPSec Security Associations (SAs) in a routing domain. Router A wishes to
broadcast or multicast a routing information packet to B, C and D. However,
since A must separately negotiate keys with its correspondents, and since this key
negotiation requires internal state computed at each node (see Diffie-Hellmann),
the security association between A and B cannot be reused between A and C. Since
a two-way AH session, for instance, requires two security associations, this means
that each router needs to maintain at least two SAs to every other router in its
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SA database. Not the least, the advantages of broadcasting and multicasting are
essentially lost, resulting in a network with vastly increased overhead: even while
the contents of a flooded LSA from A will be exactly the same for B as for D, the
latter cannot read it if it is sent using an SA not in its database. RFC4552 adresses
this problem by demanding one ingress and one egress SA be configured manually
on each router, and that each such SA is identical in terms of parameters (SPI) and
keys. In other words, the SAs are static. Only by this method can IPSec currently
scale on a broadcast or multicast role.
Through this measure, OSPF routers can continue to employ broadcasting
and multicasting where available. To reconfigure the SAs, a rollover interval
is configured, during which a third SA is used to transmit the new SA to each
router by the administrator. This third SA is not pre-configured, but negotiated
using IKE. An important concern is that the rekeying period should not allow
unauthenticated/unencrypted packets are transmitted; thus the rollover interval,
which is manually configurable. Each router will within the confines of this interval
switch to the new incoming/outgoing SA set. As a consequence, the interval needs
to be configured equal on all routers to assure that the rollover operation goes
smoothly.
5.8.3 Other proposed keying schemes in OSPFv3
RFC4552 [15] suggests that future work could explore other key management
protocols that are better suited to the broadcast environment. The protocol
mentioned specifically is Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys/Group Secure
Association Key Management Protocol (KINK/GSAKMP).
The first is one attempt at creating a dynamic keying algorithm that has a low
amount of overhead. However, it still requires centralized oversight. It is specified
in RFC4430 [41]. The formal basis of KINK operation is within the Kerberos
concept of a Key Distribution Center. Since it has not been proposed further by the
IETF as a keying algorithm for OSPFv3, this thesis does not elaborate further upon
it.
5.8.4 Managing security policies
RFC4552 permits the use of one SA on several interfaces. This stems from the
possibility of OSPFv3 operating multiple instances on one interface, determined by
Instance ID in the OSPFv3 header. Another consequence of the multiple-instances-
per-interface rule of OSPFv3 is that multiple Security Policy Databases must be
supported.
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Figure 17: Illustration of Security Associations in IPSec for OSPFv3
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5.9 Some reflections on OSPFv3 using IPSec in a MANET
It can be assumed that OSPF-MANET will reflect the principle of OSPFv3 of
dispensing with all native authentication mechanisms in favour of IPv6 built-in
IPSec.
One immediate question when considering how to offer security services to
OSPF-MANET Links, is why one should not instead simply use the offered
security services at the lower layer - link layer security in the shape of, for instance,
802.11i. One major point is the fact that IPSec is an end-to-end security protocol
suite, whereas link-layer protocols only operate at the one-hop level. The only
way to gain assurance of end-to-end integrity is to make security embed the scope
of the connection, instead of being a “relay run” through the intermediate nodes.
This is illustrated in Figure 18, where the thick lines describe the logical extent of
the security services offered by the security protocol, while the thin line describes
the session or connection. The link layer scenario at the bottom of the figure uses
three link layer security “sessions”, separate from each other, from host to host.
The contents of the packet are available to each intermediary host. The end-to-end
scenario at the top still uses the same connections, but the security “session” is
now logically end-to-end and only frames and network layer headers are available
to other hosts on the way. In a multi-hop environment with highly exposed nodes,
this distinction becomes a concern.
Additionally, IPSec in its mandated modes for OSPFv3 could for all intents
and purposes be considered the “native” security protocol for OSPFv3, and for the
sake of interoperability should be retained when and where possible.
Lastly, important services such as authentication are lost in link-layer security.
The main security benefit of link-layer security to MANET routing protocols, is the
addition of a second layer of access control in the shape of for instance a shared
key between admitted nodes. This is unfortunately not particularly useful if key
management isn’t MANET specific.
5.9.1 Thoughts on IPSec overhead
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that viable, effective insider attacks exist
against OSPFv2 [50]. Most of these can be assumed to not affected by the
minor, mainly IPv6-accomodating changes of OSPFv3; in particular, attacks using
LSA injections are unaffected, since the structure of the LSA payload remains
unchanged between the versions. Furthermore, all of these attacks benefit from
the basic security challenges imposed by the MANET environment. However,
IPSec provides a strong protection against these attacks. Can a real-life-proof
OSPF-MANET implementation dispense with IPSec? If not, what degradations
of performance can be expected to occur due to IPSec overhead?
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Figure 18: End-to-end vs. one-hop security
As IPSec is a key security technology in the Internet, some attention has
been devoted to how much it affects performance in terms of thtoughput. IPSec
performance measurement can be done using simulation or testbeds. Test scenarios
usually focus on either the application (HTTP, FTP) or transport level (TCP and
UDP), measuring performance using the various modes of transport and protocols
(AH, ESP) in terms of throughput; notable examples are [17].
As far as OSPF is concerned, performance is mainly a function of overhead
added to IP datagrams. While the comparison is not unproblematic, a good
approximation of IPSec performance could be to assign some value to UDP
overhead and thereby make a qualified assumption about raw IP performance under
IPSec, or simply to use UDP figures in themselves. Under any circumstance, the
performance issue in this context is not one of fractions, but rather of general
feasibility: can a MANET routed by OSPF authenticated by IPSec even provide
reasonable data rates after extra headers have taken their due?
The findings in [43] demonstrate that the performance reduction imposed by
TCP vs. UDP is hidden by IPSec overhead. By this assumption, we can surmise
roughly that throughput sinks to approximately half of unencrypted traffic using
AH and to one third using ESP.
Keying algorithms are traffic sensitive, to the extent that their overhead
exceeds that of ESP and AH traffic by around three times. Establishing key
exchange sessions between a new node increases its complexity geometrically
as the network size increases. The overhead caused by keying combined with
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the practical difficulties of manual keying in a MANET compounds the need
for an alternative keying protocol to be available to OSPF-MANET to make
IPSec authentication/encryption feasible. In practice, keying IPSec according to
RFC4552 becomes an issue pertaining to the “administrative” network protocol
layer; while technological solutions are found to be lacking because of processing
or link overhead, or because they cannot accomodate the one-to-many links, or
because implementing a key infrastructure is thought to introduce single-points-
of-failure, the network owner will be forced to accept the limited entropy of the
manual keys and change them as he sees fit. Whether this is practical is another
issue, but one which nonetheless in the end determines whether RFC4552 can offer
OSPF-MANET the cryptographic protection it requires to protect itself against
external node attacks.
5.9.2 The Issue of managing Security Associations in MANETs
An even more serious objection against using IPSec in MANET settings is the
management of Security Associations. Since these are intended to be manual in
OSPFv3, the presence of a centralized oversight to ensure this must be present
in order for the IPv6 Security Header to function in a MANET. As such, the
issue becomes one of management and organization. It has been claimed in [20]
that a network created for the purpose of an “operational scenario” can tolerate
centralization of tasks. This is because there exists a central point of trust, perhaps
manifested as a command center, through which pre-configuration of security state,
as an SA is a perfect example of, can be performed.
What of a network without such a central point of trust? If an ad-hoc network
is to be spontaneous, it may lack any beforehand planning that could have allowed
participants to agree upon security state and parameters. Works such as [19]
and [13] elaborate upon key management in MANETs. The former provides a
good, concise insight into the field of MANET key management.
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6 Other methodology for routing security research
As most works concerning routing protocol attacks are theoretical, the extent of
the damage incurred yearly by these forms of attacks is uncertain. There are far
fewer reported cases of routing attacks than, for instance, DDoS attacks against
applications or network intrusion. One reason for this is that routing protocols
are highly complex, and attacking them warrants a high level of competence, as
was the case with attacks on host security until the early nineties. One reason
why host security attacks have become more common, is partially because user-
friendly tools exist that permit an attacker of less competence than is required to
implement such an attack with the means to perform them. Another is that host
and network security attacks are becoming more motivated by the possibility of
exploiting them for financial fraud or theft. These kinds tools are now gradually
becoming more common, and as illicit hacker circles become gradually more aware
of the obvious advantages of routing protocol attacks to enhance host and network
security attacks, so will routing attacks become more of a concern. This section
details the fundamental procedures and techniques that can be employed to deploy
various routing protocol attacks.
This would assist to illustrate that routing attacks are indeed possible, and not
just theoretical exercices, this short section shows some tools which might prove
useful for the security researcher who wishes to delve further into the field. All are
available through the Internet and run on any Unix equipped with the basic glibc
and has Perl5 installed.
6.1 Knowing the network
The first goal of an attacker of a routing protocol is to obtain a comprehensive map
of the network. To this end, several tools can be used in conjunction.
The basic tool for analyzing a network is the packet sniffer, based simply
on listening to a common broadcast medium and filtering the incoming content
according to rules of varying complexity, and port scanners like nmap. Packet
sniffers exploit the simple broadcast link type to register any packet that comes
in that is not addressed to the adapter or a broad/enabled multicast address. They
are usable in routing protocol attacks to listen for routing protocol packets without
actively obtaining them through queries.
The main difference between a packet sniffer and a port scanner is that the latter
actively seeks out responsive interfaces on various network socket port numbers
that are familiar (such as port 80 for HTTP) in order to establish which services
run. While sending a Hello message into an OSPF Area does not constitute port
scanning in the classic sense, it nevertheless works in the same manner. Most
prudent network administrators will set rules to trigger for such behavior and set
off alarms; no such thing should therefore be attempted without the consent of the
network owner beforehand to prevent a false alarm.
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6.1.1 nmap
nmap is an open-source utility that listens to IP datagrams, and parses them
to obtain information about the network, and the hosts which comprise it.
It is well documented, an has an active user community mainly comprising
information technology security specialists, who employ nmap to audit their
networks. Amongst its ample features is the possibility to detect OS versions
of network hosts. At its most basic, nmap is a port scanner, but with highly
advanced features to gleam the most information possible from the scans. nmap
is an “active” scanner, that is, it can be heard while it scans. For instance, nmap
will map TCP ports by initiating the three-way TCP handshake mechanism, then
immediately close the connection once the handshake is complete and take note
of the host and port number. The prudent network adminstrator will configure his
Intrusion Detection to discover unsanctioned port scanning on his network, and
take appropriate action as needed.
6.1.2 Siphon
Offering much of the same services as nmap, but passively, Siphon is a project
which makes a network mapper which uses characteristics of various protocol
implementations to extract as much information about a host originating each
packet as possible. Thus, Siphon merely needs to listen for all packets on the
incoming interface (promiscuous mode), without needing to reveal itself as nmap
does with its active mapping.
6.2 Some tools usable for active routing attacks
Most of the routing attacks described in the routing attacks in Section 5.3
depend on the interception of routing information or routing data, followed by
modification and re-insertion, or generation of new messages. Surprisingly few
of the described attack types against routing protocols rely on resource-costly
and difficult cryptanalysis. The reasons are of course obvious; if an attacker can
dispense with costly and difficult cryptanalysis in favour of simple packet injection
or leveraging other weaknesses in the basic properties of the attacked protocol, he
will choose the method which provides the most result if the overall goal is simply
to disrupt routing.
nemesis is a command-line utility which permits IP packets with customized
headers to be injected into a network with a payload of choice. nemesis simply
generates a packet based upon the command-line parameters supplied by the user,
then emits it as an IP datagram. In this manner, it can for instance be used to
inject packets across an adjacency that has been established by some other means.
However, as it demands the user to manually create a payload (the OSPF packet, in
this case), it is probably not well usable for this purpose, but rather for instance
for TCP DoS attacks or similar where the payload is more or less irrelevant.
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# ospf-ash.pl
-- OSPF Attack Shell - 0.14 --
Using device : eth0
Using source IP : 192.168.0.101
Using source MAC: 00:13:a9:2c:5b:a3
ash> listen
Hello from: 192.168.0.21








Figure 19: ospf-ash usage example with route injection
Automation is key if one is to inject OSPF packets into an AS convincingly. This
is where ash comes in.
ash [2], short for Attack SHell, is a utility which runs as an interactive shell,
permitting the user to act as an OSPF instance injecting a Link State Update into
the broadcast medium. ospf-ash is freely available on the Internet for download,
and is written in Perl using the Net::Frame modules. It is easy to use, but warrants
knowledge of the protocol to be effective. ash is notably available for OSPF, and is
a highly useful tool for carrying a number of the attacks described in Section 5.3.
In Figure 19 is a usage example for ospf-ash, gathered from [2]. The shell is
first used to listen for IP datagrams using protocol type 89. After a short wait, the
DR and BDR respond. The user manually starts the Link State synchronization
phase: DR and BDR transmit LS Database Descriptor packets to the ash session,
which requests the LSAs in turn.
Once the adjacency has been built, it is maintained (locked) by periodic Hello
emits. Finally, a route is injected across the adjacency from ash, in the shape of a
Router LSA.
ash is not yet ported to OSPFv3. It is written in Perl using the Net::Frame
module, which is well documented. The script is only 636 lines long in version
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0.14, and even while it says little about the number of functions inherited through
the Net::Frame module, it does demonstrate quite clearly that such tools do not
need to be large and monolothic in order to be sophisticated. While not anyone
could implement such a script without good knowledge of the protocol, it can be
used by the less OSPF-literate since it hides much of the underlying complexity of
the protocol (note for instance the “exchange” macro, which automated the LS DB
exchange).
6.3 A proposal for an improved, security-accomodating network
simulator
Throughout the work of this thesis, I have taken note of the methods in which
routing security research is conducted. For the main part, this consists of theoretical
analysis of the routing protocol, as in this thesis, or attacks are implemented in test
beds using for instance vendor equipment. Notable examples of the former are
mainly conducted by the hacking community, or as large-scale, long-term projects.
Simulations are a powerful tool for network researchers, permitting an indis-
pensable tool for estimating with variable degrees of precision the effectiveness and
performance of various network protocols, and also to demonstrate the function-
ing of technology. Network simulation tools abound; common established systems
include ns2 and JSim, and more recent additions to the bestiary are GTNetS and
OMNet++. All these systems are open-license, in addition, several commercial
products are available. The common usage of these simulators is that of an ap-
plication, a centralized event handler, which receives and emits state from different
threads representing the various communicating entries present in the simulation
system, notably in the case of a network, hosts, interfaces, packets, and so forth
- in varying degrees of granularity depending upon modularity. The simulation
is mainly deterministic; results will never be exact as pseudorandom factors will
determine for instance packet emittance (the Bernoulli distribution is one typical
probability distribution used for this purpose), but will generally fall within the
same confines as the number of pollings increases.
The scenario to be simulated will usually be configured in some manner by the
user; ns2 and JSim infamously uses Tcl scripts for this purpose, while GTNetS has
a separate scenario file format and OMNet++ uses XML files. This configuration
can be quite costly in terms of time, while attempts have been made to alleviate this
by automating to some extent the creation of the network topology and individual
node configuration.
During the simulation, the simulator writes a tracefile, which may then be used
for purposes of information retrieval by graphing numerical data, parsing the text
for incidences of various patterns using scripts, or even grooming the tracefile
either in- or post-simulation to allow a trace visualizer show the scenario as a
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graphical animated presentation. Tools of the latter category include the stand-
alone nam, while for instance OMNet+ and GTNetS include their own visualizers.
6.3.1 Why simulations are not ideal for evaluating routing attacks
Simulators work non-interactively during simulation: the simulator registers,
processes and records events and the user waits during the execution, evaluating
data afterwards. This makes network simulators in their common present form
less-than-ideal for the kind of research where routing protocol attacks are evaluated
and tested: the lack of simulation-time monitoring prevents the observation of
events related to the attack in progress that might be difficult to retrieve from post-
simulation logs, or are even lost in their complexity, while the lack of in-simulation
interaction prevents the researcher from introducing attack stimuli conveniently,
the alternative being the often cryptic and tedious work of writing configuration
files. These are by no means concerns that are important to routing security
research alone; it’s merely the fact that they are more important.
Contemporary simulators accomodate network researchers whose main interest
lies not in the qualitative aspect of the protocol function, but rather its quantitative:
how many bits per second throughput can protocol P gain from modifying
parameter Pv by a given amount? Conversely, the routing security acolyte will be
looking into the actual fact of a protocol being able to function. Even while Denial-
of-Service is a “quantitative” attack, rather than a “qualitative” attack like the now-
infamous MaxSeq++, the fact remains. This is by two observations: in the case
where Denial-of-Service is instigated from outside the routing nodes themselves to
overwhelm their inner event handling process by keeping incoming interfaces full,
the traffic rush can easily be modelled in the proposed attack simulator without
having to manually configure each and every node in the attackers’ assumed botnet,
and in the case where the DoS consists of the routers themselves killing a low-
capacity network by being stimulated to emit increasing numbers of overhead
traffic, that is again a “qualitative” response in which the researcher is mainly
interested in by what stimulus in what amount at what time each router can be
incited to show this destructive operating pattern. The case is simply that looking
at the Bits-per-second graph afterwards hides potentially crucial details from the
scientist, which might otherwise be revealed by runtime visual and numerical
analysis.
While polling parameters and graphing them afterwards is principally a tool
of interest for performance-oriented network research, it should by no means be
discarded. However, in the proposed simulator, the polling needs to be presented
graphically in runtime charts configurable by the scientist. These charts can well




The purpose of simulators is often stated to be to establish a credible model
of reality permitting the simulator user the opportunity to experience a training
scenario in which stimulus incites response; this does not immediately paralell the
use of network simulators, which instead could be seen as discrete event predicters.
In this sense, they resemble process controll regulators, in which for instance a
refinery may introduce production-line polls of variables in order to predict the
development of the system at discrete time intervals into the future in order to better
tune production parameters to increase efficiency. The simulator described here
would more closely resemble a simulator in the classical sense; stimulus translated,
processed and responded to along the timeline.
One important feature is the way in which the system is designed. Based
on modern, highly compartmentalized and modular simulators like GTNetS and
OMNet++, the simulator needs to feature strong abstraction between entities like
routing protocols, network interfaces, in a similar fashion as a real network node
provides abstraction between the layers of the network stack. The purpose of
this is mainly to offer a strong support for interchanging various modules as
needed, making the replacement of one protocol for another with a similar interface
seamless.
The modularity needs to be reflected in the visual representation of the
simulation. While ordinary simulators mainly process the scenario in the
background, which suffices perfectly fine for estimating performance and function,
the attack/security simulator needs to provide a continuous, time-line graphical
representation of the network. Graphical representation of tracefiles is already,
as mentioned, possible with nam, however, this animation is only provided post-
simulation. In order for the scientist to efficiently analyze the functioning of a
theorized attack, the simulation must therefore respond in simulation-time.
Stimulus into the scenario can be provided by numerous means, ranging
from explicitly changing variables in entities in the system on-the-fly to a more
reasonable shell-type interaction. The shell used can either be proprietary, or it
could, more ambitiously, be a Unix shell of any type running on top of a POSIX
compliant event handler which permits the user to actually use existing applications
like nam, nemesis, snort and similar security tools transparently, without a
need for adapting them in any way. This would perhaps be the single most useful
feature of this simulator. If the shell were not to be of a Unix type, an option that
should under any circumstance be provided is that of at least one good, universal
scripting language, preferrably perl on account of its good network modules, that
would permit the user to instigate attacks more conveniently.
It would be beneficial for the simulator to allow the user to configure
notifications, triggered by any given criteria. These could for instance be a given
interval time between packet emittances being surpassed, or that a specific global
variable in a local routing process being assigned a given value.
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The simulator would need to implement security protocols at all levels. The
purpose of this would not be to provide any cryptanalytic exercise value, but
rather to introduce the managerial constraints of maintaining security protocols
operational, mainly illustrate the complexity of key distribution, memory overhead,
and management complexity. For instance, a user electing to use IPSec could
choose to build a report showing the complexity of SA management in an easily
presentable format. While it could be argued that such calculations are redundant
as they can just as easily be carried out by pen and paper, having the option of easy
presentation of them would likely be a welcome one. As before, the emphasis is
on function demonstration rather than actual performance analysis.
All classes of the network, ranging from hardware-level interfaces like
antennae to running processes, should be accessible in-simulation by the scientist.
The main reason for this is to permit the scientist to at any time record the exact,
complete state of the system: security often hides in the details, and to disclose
information relevant to it, the scientist should therefore not be denied any access at
all. Scripting would constitute a powerful means by which to automate information
retrieval, or to evaluate it mid-simulation.
6.3.3 Benefits
It is my opinion that a simulator environment as described above, would provide
network security scientists with a powerful means to analyze network and routing
security theories without the excessive cost and time associated with test beds, or
with circumventing or alerting network administrators of testing in a live network.
While test beds are indispensable for most projects aiming for anything more
than publication of findings, planning them could well be vastly more effective
if scientists were able to model them beforehand and work with them in the same
manner as they would with an actual network of steel, plastic and radio waves.
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7 Analysis
This section aims to identify key issues in OSPF routing security when a MANET
interface extension is added. In order to accomplish this, the thesis has so far
focused heavily on the various protocols and more basic concepts that surround
the subject. The following section, then, is devoted to tying this background into a
whole.
7.1 Security and the transition from OSPFv2 to OSPFv3
The first central question is, of course, whether the transition to OSPFv3 introduces
security weaknesses compared to OSPFv2. My answer to this is that it does not, or
at least not to any large extent. The justifications for this statement are twofold:
First, the core OSPF state machine, which handles and stores the link state,
remains essentially the same. A Shortest-Path-First algorithm operates on a set of
Link State Advertisements, in the process building a routing table.
Secondly, apart from this, the Area system remains unchanged, adding the
security strong and weak points of partitioning and the crucial importance of
the Backbone Area, respectively. The replacement of subnets with links merely
implies an extension of the former to include the entire link-layer domain on the
interface.
On the other hand, security has seen at least one significant gain with the
transition to the new version.
7.1.1 IPSec key management issues in a MANET
The major security breakthrough of OSPFv3 compared to v2 is without a doubt
the introduction of the IPv6 Security Header (IPSec AH or ESP mode header) as
mandatory, removing the somewhat ineffective [24] native OSPFv2 authentication
scheme.
This act moves all cryptographic services out of the routing protocol (thereby
removing the requirement for accomodating an intricate and encompassing security
protocol when implementing the protocol in software - a feature of “security by
simplicity”). The OSPF packet enjoys strong cryptographic security services at all
levels. However, there are problems associated with using IPSec for this purpose,
some of which remain unsolved. The main problem is, of course, the difficult
keying issue.
Routers operate often in a one-to-many fashion. IPSec Security Associations
cannot offer security services to such connections, since they are always
automatically negotiated using IKE/IKEv2 on a strict one-to-one basis. Alternative
keying mechanisms have been proposed that allow the creation of “group keys”,
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but until then, the only supported solution is to manually configure a group SA at
each router.
The answer to this problem is thereby one of moving the problem altogether
into the “administrative protocol layer”, also demanding manual rekeying at regular
intervals. This contradicts the distributed nature of MANETs. If OSPFv3 is to be
used as a routing protocol for a MANET which :
• Is truly infrastructureless
• Is accomodating to late-entry nodes
• Has uncertain duration
• Is setup spontaneously
, then there exists a strong requirement for a keying scheme which can conform
to these above demands if OSPF in aMANET that is to have these above properties.
Efforts are made to uncover such a keying scheme for general use; the most
comprehensive survey of such schemes at the time of writing is in [19]. No clear
candidate has been identified by the author at the time of writing for replacing
IKE/IKEv2 for such a role.
On the other hand, a MANET owner who intends to use the network for an
operation, and is highly reliant on network and routing protocol resilience, will
likely have the organizational means to carry out the stipulated manual keying
method [20]. Examples of this includes the military, the police and rescue
organizations, where secure channels suitable for key distribution are established
as a matter of routine in the field: all these organization types possess both a
clearly defined administrative organization, as well as a supply chain. This allows
them points-of-trust at which trusted information can be collected. In addition,
such organizations usually have experience in distributing “secure state” in some
form, be it code sheets, manual programming of frequencies in radio sets or other
classified information. The manual keying of a node can thereby be carried out
by such an organization at any time, permitting late-entry as well as centralized
keying en masse as part of preparations for bringing up the network.
Of further interest to this user category is the long timespan of the keys as seen
in relation to what could be the expected lifespan of most tactical networks. A
three-month recommended interval between rekeyings is a long time. There exists
a good possibility that a typical operation network will be outlived by its key set.
OSPFv3 remains as vulnerable as OSPFv2 to Byzantine - or faulty node -
attack vectors. An enemy striking from within can participate in the routing
process unnoticeably and carefully choose a moment and method of striking using
faulty packet injection. The main counterdefenses against attacks originating from
this vector are sound administration policies to ensure host integrity, secure key
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distribution channels, keen network observation and the possibility of adding state
machines to each router permitting them to shrug off some meta-data based attacks,
in particular the MaxSequence++ attack. As always, centralized administration
is itself in contradiction with the idea of the entirely distributed MANET, but
once more, an organization that sees a need for a resilient MANET will likely
be one in which administration services, and perhaps some measure of Intrusion
Detection, are a possibility; these include in particular military, police and security,
and medium to major corporations.
To defend against external attacks, OSPF data must be protected en route and
end-to-end; that is, even if the link (medium access) layer uses cryptographic-
strength integrity and confidentiality to protect its frames, then these services must
be offered at the network layer also.
This again mandates either a centralized distribution of keys for link layer or
IPSec. If the link layer is unencrypted, OSPF-MANET enabled routers must make
use of IPSec AH or ESP in the IPv6 security header as stipulated by RFC4552 in
order for the routing domain to be safe from malicious packet injection as well as
other attacks as described in Section 5.3.
The article at [14] shows how the existing IPSec protocol suite can be adapted
for the infrastructureless constraints of a MANET, and convincingly shows that
overhead is controlled, but still retains the one-to-one problem. The article is
nonetheless noteworthy.
7.1.2 Throughput performance issues with IPSec
The question of whether the added packet size will affect network performance
is difficult to answer. Throughput measurement is best done as a testbed exercise
rather than through simulation or simple calculation. The reason is, of course,
than unacceptable performance is a difficult threshold to define in a simulator, and
throughput measurements in simulators rarely are very accurate. We know that
OSPFv3 will generate a higher amount of control traffic or overhead traffic in all
OSPF-MANET proposal candidates, and that in spite of differential Hellos there is
still a higher degree of the total available bandwidth taken by OSPF in a MANET
than in an ordinary wireline network.
ESP adds 50 bits of overhead to a packet. OSPF sets a maximum packet
size to accomodate the smallest likely encountered MTU to avoid fragmentation
and detrimental performance, according to [30] this is 1280 bits. Before deciding
whether these extra 50 bits are a potential performance issue, then, some research
should be done into the expected MTUs that OSPF-MANET will encounter to
ensure that fragmentation does not occur.
To provide some insight into the absolute scale that can be expected, Figure 20,
which was gathered from [42], shows the measured overhead imposed by IPSec in
a UDP datastream running over IPv6.
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Figure 20: IPSec overhead for UDP datastream over IPv6
UDP is likely a good approximation for raw IPv6 datagrams. The figure, then
provides a sense of the scale of overhead imposed by IPSec ESP and AH. The
question of whether this will be detrimental to convergence properties cannot be
answered without comprehensive field testing.
7.1.3 Summary of IPSec for OSPF-MANET
To conclude on IPSec: Provided IPSec can be keyed securely, and the overhead
in both traffic and management is sustainable, it can offer OSPF quite strong
protection against in-transit modification, and offer authentication. It can not
protect against replay attacks [15], and the potential damages this can cause
are documented in [24]. They include in particular DoS, as a constantly
replayed Link State Request, for instance, will result in redundant database
synchronization to occur, claiming resources from both routers participating in
the DB exchange as well as increasing traffic in a potentially crowded wireless
network. Another damaging effect that can result from such replay attacks can
disrupt adjacencies between routers by falsely leading routers to believe adjacency
is not accomplished, for instance.
7.2 Possible counter to the MaxSequence++ attack
The potentially devastating effect of the MaxSequence++ [49] attack has been
documented by [49] [50], demonstrating how a testbed-network using vendor
equipment was barred from adding LSAs to the link state for up to an hour simply
by the injection of one packet with the Sequence number set to maximum. While
this is an impressive result, the ingeniously simple attack methodology begs the
question of whether preventing it can be done as easily.
TCP uses a sequence number scheme similar to OSPF. However, while OSPF
permits out-of-order sequence numbers, simply using them to determine which of
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two identical LSAs is the relevant one, TCP uses the sequence number for packet
reassembly for the next layer. The TCP sequence number, unlike in OSPF, has
some constraints set on it due to technical concerns. The sequence number must
fit inside a sliding window, a configurable interval which is incremented for each
arrival of a packet that has a sequence number matching the current lower boundary
of the window. Any packet with a sequence number higher than what fits inside
the window will be discarded.
Sliding windows are also a feature of IPSec, being the mechanism which
protects against replay attacks. It is easy to see that a feature resembling the
TCP sliding window state machine can be used by a router to discard packets
whose sequence numbers are outside of the expected range. This feature would
not interfere with the protocols operation if implemented correctly, as it would not
itself modify any packets.
Instead of manually configuring or defining statically the size of the sliding
window, the router process could be written so that it will accomodate a large
variety of traffic scenarios by enabling it to adjust the sliding window according
to the circumstances. More specifically, the sliding window state machine can use
an algorithm that employs statistical distribution to establish whether a packet falls
outside the reasonably expectable interval. Consider, for instance the statistical
concept of the outlier - defined as any value which falls short of or exceeds the first
and third quartiles (the median is the second quartile) by a distance of 1.5 times
the standard deviation of the distribution. By setting the distribution to be the last
500 arrived sequence numbers, the router will adapt to the varying conditions in
the network when establishing what constitutes and unreasonably high sequence
number, and the process can be left automatic, aiding system administration.
While such a scheme is not mandated by the OSPF RFCs, it doesn’t contradict
them, either: while they specify a set of constraints inside of which an arrived
packet must be found, or be dropped, nor do they prohibit any extension of packet
examination as long as it does not allow non-protocol-conforming packets to be
further processed by the interior SPF process. Several vendors take liberties with
the existing specifications by circumventing RFC keywords (MUST, SHALL) and
taking advantage of others (MAY). For instance, one vendor, Cisco, includes the
ability for the network adminstrator to manually configure the Hello Interval on
select models of its routers to increase network agility and responsiveness, even if
the RFC specifies a standard interval: the adjustment in itself does not affect the
protocol per se, it merely tunes it.
7.3 Other attacks
Black holes present a particular challenge in a MANETs, since the attackers
effort to falsely obtain routes passing through his node can be aided by physical
positioning unlike in an ordinary, wireline broadcast network.
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The security threat to the Autonomous System as a whole is likely to increase
if the MANET has a lenient admittance policy. The reason for this is that OSPF
will not allow traffic from outside to enter into the AS, however, a node that has the
privilege of sending out OSPF packets in a MANET can potentially inject harmful
information into other Areas configured in the AS the MANET takes part in. An
easy solution to this problem is to filter IPv6 protocol type 89 (OSPF) packets at
the boundaries of the MANET.
The “Fightback storm” DoS-type attack will have a more severe impact on a
resource-constrained MANET, as will all DoS attacks. The attacker seeking to
impair the functioning of a MANET should likely therefore focus on methods to
make the network “suffocate itself” by triggering massive OSPF packet emissions
at strategic timing intervals.
7.4 What the MANET interface type means for OSPF security
Apart from these above-mentioned attacks, all known OSPF attacks will remain
possible. What remains to be seen, however, is in what manner the increased
convergence speed will counteract the effects of these attacks. Since OSPF-
MANET candidates offer a more “agile” routing protocol on its interfaces, it
could be conjectured that the self-healing ability of the MANET link type after
a successful attack is higher than that of the traditional broadcast and point-to-
multipoint link types.
Each OSPF routing process is served by a number of interfaces on various
link types. It can be assumed that the security of the router as a whole will
be determined by the lowest common denominator. This does not imply that a
MANET-interface on a router will automatically imply a loss of security. Indeed,
if the link is sufficiently weak, the simplistic point-to-point interface type can
very well present a greater security risk than a MANET interface; for instance, an
external attacker can have gained access to some intermediate point in the physical
medium and taken control of it, modifying packets.
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7.5 Concluding remarks
The thesis has extensively documented the function of OSPFv3, as well as a
selection of proposals for OSPF-MANET link/interface type extension.
OSPF is a versatile, popular and well-known Internal Gateway routing
protocol. The reasons for this are mainly fast convergence, an open standard,
good-quality loop-free routes, versatility and scalability. It has been improved
further with the latest version, in particular security is improved. Even while such
OSPF aspects as the Area system add to its security, the Version 2 authentication
scheme left much to be desired. For this reason, while still IPv6-only, there is some
hope in the network community that version 3 will eventually be made backwards-
compatible with IPv4 to reflect the slow adoption of IP version 6. This in order
to benefit from the improvemed version even for todays existing IPv4 networks.
Specifically, OSPFv3 benefits from good cryptographic end-to-end services in the
shape of IPv6 Security Header, or equivalently, IPSec AH and ESP protocols,
which provide good authentication/integrity to the entire OSPF packet, provided
the necessary keying is available. OSPFv3 can be extended to function adequately
in a MANET setting, although work still remains to reduce the overhead it imposes
further. Still, it is able to converge and offer loop-free routes of a high quality.
The thesis then proceded to document IPSec, as well as provide a background
in wireless network or MANET security issues. There is a need for improved
key management for IPSec when set as a security protocol in a routing domain.
More specifically, what is needed a dynamic key management scheme which would
permit keying to occur across the one-to-many connections typical of routing
protocols, and without manual intervention. Several proposals may provide such a
service, but no standardization efforts have so far been concluded. In the meantime,
manual keying in the form of manual configuration of Security Associations at each
node is the required mode of operation. This may pose a problem if a network is
to be truly infrastructureless or spontaneous, but can likely be circumvented when
the network is an operation network that is part of a centralized organization. This
is because the latter can organize points-of-trust at which keying can occur, and
that such organizations often already have mechanisms in work for distribution of
classified information.
OSPF resistance to Byzantine node failures, the sudden and unexpected
occurrence that one node begins to exhibit non-mandated behaviour, is first and
foremost implemented through strict conformance analysis of packets on arrival,
dropping packets deemed outside of accepted boundaries and formalisms without
any further treatment. This denies faulty state contained in Byzantine router
packets from entering the state of the receiving router, in the case where the packet
is malformed. If the packet is well-formed, a Byzantine router can export faulty
state to other routers. Several OSPF mechanisms can be assumed to play some
part in nullifying faulty state propagation. While fightback is postulated as one
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such, practice shows that it often is ineffective and that it even can be used in a
Denial-of-Service class of attacks.
The Designated Router scheme has security implications. The election of
a router destined in the future to turn into a Byzantine node, either by a non-
catastrophic logical failure or a conscious subversion by a non-authorized entity,
as Designated Router in an OSPF Area will essentially mean that all routers in
the Area will be adjacent to a faulty router and assume its state through periodic
updates. All state arriving at the faulty router must be assumed to be untrustworthy
in such a scenario, and consequently all adjacencies must be considered tainted.
This is a dramatic, if extreme, example of how the DR scheme potentially can
introduce a Single-point-of-Failure weakness in an OSPF network - even if the DR
is Byzantine in nature, the BDR will not assume its duties until Hellos from the
DR subside.
The OSPF Area system is a security benefit. However, the introduction of one
or more routers with a MANET interface enabled into an AS may be a security
liability, as the inherent security threats of the more exposed link type potentially
can trickle into the Autonomous System. OSPF can easily be secured from most
outsider attacks by filtering IP frames with protocol type 89 at network ingress, as is
also usually done. However, the inclusion of aMANETArea into an existing OSPF
network can constitute a backdoor into the AS since the general medium will be
available to would-be attackers, though disadvantaged by the need for geographic
proximity.
MANET wireless networks face a number of security challenges imposed by
their limited capacity, mobility, general access medium and lack of centralized
infrastructure. These include a vulnerability to attacks carried out from external
nodes, to difficulties in achieving cryptographic keying. MANET security has
become a concern for numerous research projects which aim to introduce these
networks to a wider usage than currently, as their potential benefits of resilience,
generality and mobility or considered highly desirable. While secure routing
protocols have been proposed for MANET networks, OSPF is not such a secure
protocol by inherent design and needs to have security retrofitted. Even though
it has been demonstrated that IPSec is not optimal for this, there are still strong
advantages of using it, including interoperability and the good ability it has for
extension of protocols. It offers generally good cryptographic algorithms, but the
hash algorithms do need some attention, as in particular SHA-1 has been subject
to substantial cryptanalysis efforts in later years.
The thesis has presented some useful utilities that could be used by a routing
protocol attacker, including an automated tool that allows a user to interactively
build adjacencies and inject LSAs. Further work is possible in the field of routing
attack research, and while simulations and testbeds provide a method of observing
such attacks in practice, an application was suggested which extends current
network simulators with the capability of interaction during the simulation run.
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Such an application would have a lessened emphasis on raw throughput and instead
focus on the state of the routers and the operation of the routing protocol. This
could make implementing a potential attack far easier in order to verify its validity
without going through costly testbeds and with better ability to control the attack
than with a non-interactive, scripted simulator.
When the OSPF-MANET working group finally arrives at a candidate for
interface type extension, OSPFv3 will be a highly versatile routing protocol
suitable for almost any link type. In spite of this, security constraints in the
MANET network type further expose the challenging task of using IPSec as end-
to-end security for OSPF. Further work into the field should therefore focus on
how IPSec modes and operation for OSPF can be improved. Work has been and is
being done on MANET key management, and what has been done in this field can
possibly be of interest to OSPF security researchers.
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8 Terms and definitions
Most of these definitions are directly the same as used in most of RFC2460 and
RFC1930. For reasons of clarity I also include some central terms I use.
• Upper layer - a protocol layer immediately above IPv6. Examples are
transport protocols such as TCP and UDP, control protocols such as ICMP,
routing protocols such as OSPF, and internet or lower-layer protocols being
"tunneled" over (i.e., encapsulated in) IPv6 such as IPX, AppleTalk, or IPv6
itself [11]
• Node - any device (router or host) that implements IP.
• Router - a node that forwards IP packets not explicitly addressed to itself.
• Host any node that is not a router, i.e. it does not forward packets addressed
to others.
• Link - A communications facility at a layer below IP, over which nodes
exchange IP packets directly without decrementing IP TTL (Hop Limit).
• Neighbors - nodes attached to the same wired medium link, or nodes which
are within two-way or one-way transmission and/or listening range on the
wireless medium link. (See Note below.)
• Interface - a node’s attachment to a link.
• Address - an IPv6-layer identifier for an interface or a set of interfaces.
• Packet - an IPv6 header plus payload.
• General - capable of operating in a general capacity; common; not particular.
• Dedicated - set apart for a specific purpose alone.
• Autonomous System (AS) - a connected group of one or more IP prefixes
run by one or more network operators which has a single and clearly defined
routing policy.
• Router adjacency - that a set of two or more routers implementing a Link
State routing protocol have synchronized their link state databases with each
other. A distinction of particular importance is that adjacency does not imply
neighborship, and vice versa.
• Connected (graph theory) - a path can be established from every vertice v to
all other vertices in the graph.
92
• Dominating set (graph theory) - the subset G’ = (E’, V’)of the graph G = (E,
V) such that for every vertex in V that is not also a member of V’, there exists
an edge between itself and some vertex in V’. A colloquial term sometimes
used for the dominating set is the “backbone” of the graph.
Note : the definition of ’neighbors’ needs to be broadened for topics in the wireless
medium, to imply the possible one-way or two-way links that may be encountered.
8.1 Abbreviations
• ABD - Area Border Router (OSPF)
• AODV - Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector
• AOR - Active Overlapping Relay
• AS - Autonomous System
• ASBR - AS boundary router(OSPF)
• (B)DR - (Backup) Designated Router(OSPF)
• DH - Diffie-Hellman
• IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
• IGP - Interior Gateway Protocol
• IP - Internet Protocol
• LSA - Link State Advertisement
• LSU - Link State Update
• LSDB - Link State Data Base
• KINK - Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
• MANET - Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork
• (B)MDR - (Backup) Mobile Designated Router
• MPR - Multi Point Relay
• NSSA - Not-so-stubby Area(OSPF)
• OLSR - Optimized Link-State Routing
• OSPF - Open Shortest Path First(OSPF)
• OSPF-MDR - OSPF Mobile Designated Router
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• RFC - Request For Comments (an IETF technical standards document)
• SA - Stubby Area(OSPF)
• TSA - Totally Stubby Area(OSPF)
• TLV - Type/Length/Value
• WOSPF-OR - Wireless OSPF Overlapping Relays
• SA - Security Association
• SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm
• SPD - Security Policy Database
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